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A Sixth Amendment Inclusionary Rule for Fourth
Amendment Violations
SCOTT W. HOWE
Early in the tenure of Chief Justice Roberts, a five-Justice majority of
the Supreme Court signaled that it was ready to consider eliminating the
exclusionary rule as a remedy for Fourth Amendment violations. The central
concern was that, even after decades of limiting the rule through new
exceptions, it purportedly lacked utility in balancing protections against the
competing dangers of crime and police abuse, the only rationale on which
it has been grounded in the modern era. That existential reappraisal never
openly occurred, and the exclusionary rule, in further reduced form, still
survives. Yet, given the Court’s recent conservative shift, there is reason to
think that such a fundamental reassessment could now happen. On that view,
the methods by which the Court could eliminate the exclusionary rule
become important, as do some central normative questions that abolition
would raise: In a world without court-ordered suppression, how, if at all,
should the Constitution protect criminals against government searches and
seizures? And how should it balance protection for law-abiders between the
competing dangers of crime and police abuse? For the sake of exploring the
implications, this Article assumes that the Court will, indeed, eviscerate the
exclusionary rule as a judicially mandated remedy. The Article discusses
four routes that the Court could follow. All of them, like the exclusionary
rule, have defects. However, one stands out for protecting law-abiders
somewhat from police overreach while only modestly protecting criminals
and for resting on a constitutional grounding. The Court could substitute for
the exclusionary rule an “inclusionary rule” based on the right to jury trial
in the Sixth Amendment.

613

ARTICLE CONTENTS
INTRODUCTION .................................................................................... 615
I.

FORFEITURE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT INTERESTS .............. 624

II. FORFEITURE OF A CONSTITUTIONALLY-GROUNDED
REMEDY .......................................................................................... 630
III. ABANDONMENT OF THE UTILITARIAN
JUSTIFICATION FOR THE REMEDY............................................. 633
IV. AN INCLUSIONARY RULE FOR FOURTH
AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS ......................................................... 640
A.
B.
C.

THE APPROACH ........................................................................... 640
THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS ....................................................... 643
AN ASSESSMENT ......................................................................... 648

CONCLUSION ........................................................................................ 652

A Sixth Amendment Inclusionary Rule for Fourth
Amendment Violations
SCOTT W. HOWE *
INTRODUCTION
One of the harder questions to answer about the Fourth Amendment1
concerns how the doctrine should aim to safeguard criminals. This question
typically arises in discussions about the kinds of interests that the Fourth
Amendment protects, which, according to the Supreme Court’s rulings for
more than a century, include interests used to commit and cover up crimes.2
The question also arises in discussions of remedy, because the Court, again
for more than a century, has imposed evidence exclusion in criminal cases for
violations,3 although, in the last fifty years, it has created many exceptions.4
The question can take several forms, but, in the context of hypotheticals, it
might go like this: “How can a terrorist ever have a legitimate expectation of
being able to hide a bomb in his suitcase?” In another context, the question
might be: “How can a murderer have a protected interest in concealing his
dead victim in the trunk of his car?” In more abstract terms, the question is
essentially this: “Why should Fourth Amendment law ever protect liberty,

*
Frank L. Williams Professor of Criminal Law, Dale E. Fowler School of Law, Chapman
University. For support of various kinds during the preparation of this article, I thank Danny Bogart,
Sherry Leysen, Celestine McConville and Richard Redding. Most importantly, I thank Jetty Maria HoweCascante, without whose help the article would not have come to fruition.
1
The Fourth Amendment provides:

The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects,
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no Warrants
shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation, and
particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to be seized.
U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
2
See Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914) (asserting that “[t]his protection reaches all
alike, whether accused of crime or not”); see also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 622, 638 (1886)
(describing one issue as whether “a search and seizure, or, what is equivalent thereto, a compulsory
production of a man’s private papers, to be used in evidence against him in a proceeding to forfeit his
property for alleged fraud against the revenue laws . . . is . . . an ‘unreasonable search and seizure’ within
the meaning of the Fourth Amendment of the Constitution” and answering that question affirmatively).
3
See, e.g., Weeks, 232 U.S. at 398 (concluding that papers seized from petitioner in violation of the
Fourth Amendment were not admissible against him in his criminal trial).
4
See JOSHUA DRESSLER, ALAN C. MICHAELS & RIC SIMMONS, I UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE: INVESTIGATION 354–79 (7th ed. 2017) (discussing various exceptions to the Fourth
Amendment exclusionary rule).
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privacy, and property interests when they are used for committing or covering
up crime?”
That question is a central subject of this Article. The answer would not
be simple even if current Fourth Amendment law were static. Yet, the
priority of interests that the doctrine protects, and in what fundamental ways,
continues to be disputed even among the Justices.5 Moreover, the doctrine
on how to treat criminals under the amendment may soon change in ways
that will also affect the answer.6
The Supreme Court has focused over the years mostly on the remedial
aspect of the problem of how to treat criminals under the amendment—mostly,
that is, on the exclusionary rule. The Court has not provided an extensive
rationale for its conclusion that law-breakers in the first instance have Fourth
Amendment interests to help them commit and hide their crimes. On that
score, the Court has not claimed in the modern era to have found and
followed an original understanding.7 However, in 1914, apparently on the
view that the text did not except criminals, the Court concluded in Weeks v.
United States that the Fourth Amendment “reaches all alike, whether
5
See, e.g., Janine Young Kim, On the Broadness of the Fourth Amendment, 74 SMU L. REV. 3, 4–6
(2021) (noting various interests that Supreme Court Justices and commentators have contended the
Fourth Amendment should protect and disagreement within the Court over whether privacy or property
interests should be paramount); William Baude & James Y. Stern, The Positive Law Model of the Fourth
Amendment, 129 HARV. L. REV. 1821, 1857–58 (2016) (advocating a view of the Fourth Amendment
that would protect a variety of values beyond liberty, privacy, and property); Lawrence Rosenthal, Binary
Searches and the Central Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 22 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 881, 885–87
(2014) (noting the Court’s vacillation between libertarian and pragmatic conceptions of the Fourth
Amendment).
6
See infra text accompanying notes 42–53.
7
In Boyd v. United States, the Court contended that it identified and was following an original
understanding of the Fourth Amendment. Boyd, 116 U.S. at 623. Later, the Court rejected much of what
the Boyd opinion said. The Boyd Court stated that law-breakers were effectively immunized by the Fourth
Amendment against searches for or seizures of their “private books and papers.” See id. at 622, 630.
Also, the Boyd Court stated that searches for and seizures of “excisable” items, contraband, or stolen
goods were simply not “unreasonable.” See id. at 623–24; see also Kim, supra note 5, at 35–36 (noting
that Boyd suggested “that the Fourth Amendment protects against government trespass where the
individual has a full and legitimate property interest in the item to be seized, but not otherwise”). Later,
in Gouled v. United States, the Court underscored that government agents could not search for mere
evidence of crime, such as the shirt allegedly worn by a robber, or the private papers of the aggrieved
party, but only for items such as contraband or the instrumentalities of a crime. See 255 U.S. 298, 309
(1921). However, the Court subsequently abandoned the view that government agents could not search
for mere evidence, although it did not purport to follow the original understanding. See Warden v.
Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 306–07 (1967) (holding that police could search for clothing worn by an armed
robber in the commission of the crime). The Court also abandoned the idea that private books and papers
were not subject to searches and seizures under the Fourth Amendment. See Andresen v. Maryland, 427
U.S. 463, 465–84 (1976) (holding that neither the Fifth Amendment nor the Fourth Amendment
prevented police officers from searching the petitioner’s law office, based on a search warrant, for private
papers to be used against him in a fraud prosecution). The Court also has ruled that searches for and
seizures of contraband or stolen goods are unreasonable absent compliance with the procedural
requirements of the Fourth Amendment. See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 645, 660 (1961)
(discussing the search of a home and seizure of obscene materials).
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8

accused of crime or not.” Since that time, the Court has acted in accordance
with the Weeks proposition, with little further elaboration.9
As for the exclusionary rule, the Court first definitively applied it in Weeks
in the federal context10 and extended it to the states in Mapp v. Ohio.11 (Note
that the very existence of this remedy underscores the more basic Weeks
proposition—that law-breakers have protected interests on which they can
rely to some extent to pursue and cover up crime.12) The amendment says
nothing about remedy, and the rationales for the Court’s early imposition of
evidentiary suppression were not entirely clear, although they were not
focused on deterrence of police misconduct.13 The rationales included the idea
that an effective remedy was implicit in the Fourth Amendment prohibition,14
that exclusion was required by the Fifth Amendment privilege,15 that notions
of judicial integrity that forbade acquiescence in unconstitutional conduct
mandated suppression,16 and, perhaps, that it was simply inconsistent with the
8

Weeks, 232 U.S. at 391–92.
In later decisions, for example, the Court repeatedly held that an improper search is not validated
by the discovery of evidence of crime. See, e.g., Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28, 29–30 (1927)
(declaring it immaterial “that the search was successful in revealing evidence” of crime, and ordering the
evidence suppressed in petitioner’s criminal trial); Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 62–63 (1968)
(holding a search to be without probable cause although it turned up illegal heroin, and declaring that the
results of a search may not “serve as part of its justification”); Smith v. Ohio, 494 U.S. 541, 543 (1990)
(per curiam) (holding that a search without Fourth Amendment justification could not find validation as
a search incident to a subsequent arrest based on the results of the illegal search).
10
The Court clearly applied it in Weeks, but had arguably also applied it in Boyd, although the Court
saw the Fifth Amendment privilege at play in Boyd, 116 U.S. at 630–35, and that privilege, unlike the
Fourth Amendment, expressly embodies an exclusionary principle.
11
Mapp, 367 U.S. at 655.
12
See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) (mandating exclusion of evidence about
stolen stereo equipment based on violation of defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, and asserting that
the Constitution sometimes “insulates” a defendant’s “criminality”).
13
See, e.g., TRACEY MACLIN, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT’S
EXCLUSIONARY RULE 3 (2013) (noting that in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the Court
viewed the prohibition on the admission of unconstitutionally obtained evidence as “a constitutional right
belonging to the citizen”).
14
See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 462 (1928) (commenting on the “striking outcome
of the Weeks case . . . that the Fourth Amendment, although not referring to or limiting the use of evidence
in courts, really forbade its introduction”); see also Silas Wasserstrom & William J. Mertens, The
Exclusionary Rule on the Scaffold: But Was It a Fair Trial?, 22 AM . CRIM. L. REV. 85, 138 (1984)
(asserting that the majority opinion in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920),
indicated that exclusion was an essential part of the Fourth Amendment prohibition).
15
See, e.g., Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 478–79 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“And the use, as evidence in
a criminal proceeding, of facts ascertained by such intrusion [in violation of the Fourth Amendment]
must be deemed a violation of the Fifth.”); see also Edward S. Corwin, The Supreme Court’s Construction
of the Self-Incrimination Clause, 29 MICH. L. REV. 191, 203 (1931) (asserting that Boyd created “the rule
that evidence obtained in violation of a person’s rights under the Fourth Amendment may not under the Fifth
Amendment be validly received against him in any criminal prosecution in federal court”).
16
See Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 470 (Holmes, J., dissenting) (asserting that “for my part I think it a
less evil that some criminals should escape than that the Government play an ignoble part” and that “[i]f
the existing code does not permit district attorneys to have a hand in such dirty business it does not permit
the judge to allow such iniquities to succeed”).
9

618

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:3

broader postulates of our Constitution for evidence obtained in violation of the
Fourth Amendment to support a criminal conviction.17 In 1961, the Mapp Court
said that exclusion was an inherent right of the aggrieved defendant18 and was
also a matter of good social policy.19 However, the Court soon concluded that
the Mapp opinion was partly wrong; the aggrieved defendant has no personal
right to exclusion.20 The post-Mapp Court initially justified exclusion solely on
an instrumental theory focused on deterrence of police misconduct.21 This
somewhat narrow instrumentalism soon morphed into a broader utilitarianism
that weighs deterrence benefits against social costs.22 Since the 1970s, the
Court has justified exclusion entirely on the notion that, despite the costs,
exclusion is appropriate in a fraction of criminal cases involving violations to
promote police compliance with Fourth Amendment doctrines,23 presumably
for the primary benefit of law-abiders.24 On this view, the exclusionary rule
directly protects criminals in an effort to indirectly protect everyone else
17
The Supreme Court has not always specified the constitutional basis for its rights-based
constitutional rulings. For example, in West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette, the Court
ruled that two young sisters, both Jehovah’s Witnesses, could not be expelled from public school for
failing to salute the United States flag and recite the pledge of allegiance. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). The Court
declared that a state cannot “prescribe what shall be orthodox in politics, nationalism, religion, or other
matters of opinion or force citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein.” Id. at 642. The opinion
cited no specific clause as the basis for the ruling. Laurence Tribe has described Barnette as “rel[ying]
on no single clause of the Bill of Rights but on the broader postulates of our constitutional order.”
Laurence H. Tribe, Equal Dignity: Speaking Its Name, 129 HARV. L. REV. F. 16, 26 (2015),
https://harvardlawreview.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/11/vol129_Tribe.pdf.
18
See, e.g., Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 660 (1961) (“Our decision . . . gives to the individual no more
than that which the Constitution guarantees him . . . .”); see also Potter Stewart, The Road to Mapp v. Ohio
and Beyond: The Origins, Development and Future of the Exclusionary Rule in Search-and-Seizure Cases,
83 COLUM. L. REV. 1365, 1380–89 (1983) (describing how the exclusionary rule developed and contending
that it is essential to disincentivize and thereby help prevent Fourth Amendment violations).
19
See Mapp, 367 U.S. at 657 (asserting that the exclusionary rule “also makes very good sense”).
20
See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 29 (1968) (“The entire deterrent purpose of the rule excluding
evidence seized in violation of the Fourth Amendment rests on the assumption that ‘limitations upon the
fruit to be gathered tend to limit the quest itself.’”) (quoting United States v. Poller, 43 F.2d 911, 914 (2d
Cir. 1930)).
21
Id. at 12.
22
See, e.g., United States v. Calandra, 414 U.S. 338, 350 (1974) (“Against this potential damage to
the role and functions of the grand jury, we must weigh the benefits to be derived from this proposed
extension of the exclusionary rule.”); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 913 (1984) (“[O]ur evaluation
of the costs and benefits of suppressing reliable physical evidence seized by officers reasonably relying
on a warrant issued by a detached and neutral magistrate leads to the conclusion that such evidence should
be admissible in the prosecution’s case in chief.”).
23
See Richard M. Re, The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1885, 1897 (2014)
(noting that under the Court’s recent case law, the exclusionary rule “must yield a marginal deterrence
benefit at least commensurate with the substantial social costs of suppressing reliable evidence”); Ronald J.
Rychlak, Replacing the Exclusionary Rule: Fourth Amendment Violations as Direct Criminal Contempt, 85
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 241, 243 (2010) ( “The exclusionary rule is based on the premise that the deterrent effect
on police conduct outweighs the injustice of suppressing relevant and material evidence.”).
24
See, e.g., Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d 138, 148 (2d Cir. 1999) (asserting that “the
purpose of suppression . . . is to compel law enforcement compliance with the Fourth Amendment and
thereby prevent the invasions of law-abiding citizens’ privacy”).
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25

from police misconduct.
This modern explanation for the exclusionary rule is vulnerable.
According to prevailing discourse, the principal problem is not that
court-ordered exclusion conflicts with the original understanding.26 That
argument would be complicated by vastly changed circumstances.27 The
modern explanation for the exclusionary rule is vulnerable on its own terms.
First, it rests on an assessment that purports to weigh a category of costs
against an incommensurate kind of benefit,28 and the value, or negative
value, to be assigned to both the costs and the benefits rests largely with the
beholder.29 There also is not much helpful data to clarify the degree to which
25

See, e.g., Arizona v. Hicks, 480 U.S. 321, 329 (1987) (“But there is nothing new in the realization
that the Constitution sometimes insulates the criminality of a few in order to protect the privacy of us all.”).
26
There is no affirmative argument, based on originalism, that criminals are protected through an
exclusionary rule like that articulated in Weeks and Mapp. Suppression in criminal cases was never
mentioned by the Framers as an enforcement mechanism. AKHIL REED AMAR, THE CONSTITUTION AND
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE: FIRST PRINCIPLES 21 (1997). Likewise, the pre-founding-era common law
inherited from England “conceded the admissibility” of unlawfully obtained evidence. WILLIAM J.
CUDDIHY, THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: ORIGINS AND ORIGINAL MEANING (602–1791) 759 (2009). The
Supreme Court also did not employ court-ordered suppression until 1886, and, even then, the Court did
so only by combining the Fourth Amendment with the more clearly exclusionary Fifth Amendment
privilege against compelled self-incrimination. See Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 634–35 (1886).
Moreover, for an additional perspective on perhaps why court-ordered exclusion for violations was not
part of the original understanding, see infra Part IV.B.
27
Those favoring a court-ordered exclusionary rule could reject, on the basis of “inattention to
historical context,” an originalist position favoring a founding-era enforcement approach. See Lawrence
Rosenthal, Seven Theses in Grudging Defense of the Exclusionary Rule, 10 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 525,
532–33 (2013). First, Carol Steiker has explained that “[t]he racial diversity and divisions that
characterize twentieth-century American society were unimagined by, and indeed unimaginable to, our
eighteenth-century forebears.” Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts About First Principles, 107 HARV. L.
REV. 820, 838 (1994). Professor Steiker has argued that the exclusionary rule was partly a response to
the failure of law enforcement after the Civil War Amendments to treat Blacks as equal members of
society. Id. at 841. Second, Lawrence Rosenthal has explained that there were few law enforcement
officers in the colonies during the founding era, and their duties consisted mostly in the “execution of
warrants” and in “responding to breaches of the peace, offenses committed in their presence, and pursuing
offenders when summoned in the wake of crime.” Rosenthal, supra, at 533. They generally did not
investigate. George C. Thomas III, Stumbling Toward History: The Framers’ Search and Seizure World,
43 TEX. TECH L. REV. 199, 201 (2010). And they generally undertook a search or seizure without judicial
permission only with substantial care because, while they were immune from liability for executing a
warrant, they otherwise faced the threat of tort liability for errors. Rosenthal, supra, at 534; see also
Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 552 (1999)
(“Warrant authority was the potent source of arrest and search authority.”). Today, tort damages are
rarely imposed on and paid by police officers who violate the Fourth Amendment, due, in part, to the
qualified immunity doctrine created and enforced by the Court regarding § 1983 claims and due, largely,
to indemnification by their public employers. See Joanna C. Schwartz, How Qualified Immunity Fails,
127 YALE L.J. 2, 8–9 (2017) (noting that qualified immunity doctrine plays a minor role in shielding
police officers from financial liability); Joanna C. Schwartz, Police Indemnification, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV.
885, 890 (2014) (“Police officers are virtually always indemnified.”).
28
See Re, supra note 23, at 1897 (describing the competing values as “incommensurable”).
29
Because the Court approaches the cost-benefit questions without regard to the seriousness of the
crimes involved, the exclusionary rule also “has no sense of proportionality.” Rychlak, supra note 23, at
243.
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changes on the deterrence side of the equation are effective or the degree
to which they produce changes on the other side, particularly under varying
crime-type, geographical, and temporal circumstances.31 High-quality
empirical investigation on the subject is also notoriously difficult.32
Consequently, the Court’s assertions about the costs and benefits are
typically non-refutable.33
In this context, exclusion can always readily be viewed as a lose-lose
proposition for the law-abiding. If exclusion does not affect police behavior
much, suppression forces the community to bear the loss of evidence
supporting the defendant’s guilt for no compelling benefit.34 Alternatively,
if the exclusionary rule significantly restrains police behavior, it is logical to
suppose that it would also encourage crime, a seemingly negative
consequence for law-abiders that, along with the cost of suppression in the
individual case, could easily be thought to outweigh the police-restraining
benefit. Although good data about the effects of the exclusionary rule are
limited, empirical study has not reassured us against this latter concern.35
Consequently, considered within these parameters, neither an ineffective nor
an effective exclusionary rule (as measured by its influence on police) may
sound attractive.36
30

See, e.g., Christopher Slobogin, Why Liberals Should Chuck the Exclusionary Rule, 1999 U. ILL.
L. REV. 363, 368–69 (asserting that “[n]o one is going to win the empirical debate” because empirical
research cannot confirm how much the rule deters police violations).
31
See, e.g., Re, supra note 23, at 1901 (asserting that when weighing “the deterrent benefit against
the potential costs of increased crime,” the “courts have access to virtually no relevant data”).
32
See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 27, at 542 (noting that, while there is general agreement that
“exclusion has some deterrent effect,” there is a dearth of “reliable evidence” on the “magnitude” of the
effect “in light of the many methodological problems that face those who seek to study” the question).
33
See Re, supra note 23, at 1901 (noting that the Court’s exclusionary-rule decisions “seem to resist
falsification”).
34
See generally Dallin H. Oaks, Studying the Exclusionary Rule in Search and Seizure, 37 U. CHI.
L. REV. 665, 709 (1970) (noting, at that time, the dearth of empirical evidence that suppression deters
police violations, but also clarifying that his study was inadequate to provide “empirical substantiation
or refutation” on the issue).
35
See Raymond A. Atkins & Paul H. Rubin, Effects of Criminal Procedure on Crime Rates:
Mapping Out the Consequences of the Exclusionary Rule, 46 J.L. & ECON. 157, 159 (2003) (“The
empirical evidence reveals a significant increase in crime rates following the involuntary adoption of an
exclusionary rule as the penalty for an unlawful search and seizure.”).
36
Given that the Court has construed the Fourth Amendment to confer protected interests on
criminals and law-abiders alike, a broader perspective on the exclusionary rule would acknowledge that
the amendment itself imposes the costs and that the exclusionary rule never does more than attempt to
put the parties in the position that they would have been in had there been no government violation. See,
e.g., MACLIN, supra note 13, at xii–xiii (citing Albert W. Alschuler, Fourth Amendment Remedies: The
Current Understanding, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING
197, 199 (Eugene W. Hickock, Jr., ed., 1999)). If the Fourth Amendment were construed not to assist
persons to pursue and cover up criminal endeavors, this claim would disappear. See infra note 62.
A broader perspective on the exclusionary rule would also acknowledge that, even within the context
of a utilitarian analysis, it is relevant whether the failure to provide an effective remedy for police violations
would over time promote crime. As Justice Brandeis famously contended, “Crime is contagious. If the
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The creation of exceptions to the exclusionary rule is also a poor solution
if suppression is generally seen as non-utilitarian and utility is its only
justification. Based on the view that the exclusionary remedy often does not
substantially deter police violations or that utility is not maximized when it
does, the Supreme Court has recognized a variety of exceptions.37 Even so,
some costly consequences from exclusion potentially remain because
suppression still survives as a judicial response to a substantial amount of
police behavior.38 Also, because of the exceptions, courts now deny effective
and readily available relief to many criminal defendants, although the police
supposedly violated their Fourth Amendment rights to help secure their
convictions.39 In Marbury v. Madison,40 Chief Justice Marshall famously
warned that ours could not be called a “government of laws, and not of men
. . . if the laws furnish no remedy for the violation of a vested legal right.”41
Contrary to Marshall’s admonition, exceptions to the exclusionary rule
cast many purportedly aggrieved but apparently guilty persons as
semi-sympathetic figures, at least to observers who believe we should honor
constitutional protections.
Given the problems, it is perhaps not surprising that the Roberts Court,
several years ago, hinted that it was ready to fundamentally rethink the
exclusionary rule. In Hudson v. Michigan,42 a five-Justice majority
expressed concern that the costs of exclusion may generally outweigh the
benefits.43 The majority opinion called “into question the entire rationale of
the exclusionary rule, not just [its application] in the knock-and-announce
context” that the case presented.44 There were subsequent signals that the
Court might go in a different direction. The Court decided two cases,
Herring v. United States45 and Davis v. United States,46 in which it laid the

government becomes a lawbreaker, it breeds contempt for law . . . .” Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S.
438, 485 (1928) (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
37
See DRESSLER, MICHAELS & SIMMONS, supra note 4, at 354–79 (discussing various exceptions
to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule).
38
See Re, supra note 23, at 1899 (“While it is true that the Court has increasingly relied on
deterrence-based reasoning to nibble away at the edges of the robust exclusionary rule established in the
1960s, the core of that rule remains intact and in force today: unconstitutionally collected evidence is
presumptively inadmissible at trial.”).
39
See Guido Calabresi, The Exclusionary Rule, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 111, 114–15 (2003)
(discussing the difficulty for criminal actors to prevail in a constitutional tort action for infringements of
their Fourth Amendment interests and the additional difficulty of gaining more than small damage awards).
40
5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
41
Id. at 163.
42
547 U.S. 586 (2006).
43
See id. at 597–99. For more information on Hudson, see infra text accompanying notes 101–104.
44
David A. Moran, The End of the Exclusionary Rule, Among Other Things: The Roberts Court
Takes on the Fourth Amendment, 2005–2006 CATO SUP. CT. REV. 283, 284 (2006).
45
555 U.S. 135 (2009).
46
564 U.S. 229 (2011).
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groundwork to further undermine the rule without abolishing it completely.47
By making suppression turn on whether there was egregious police conduct
by the particular officer carrying out the search,48 those two cases provided
a foundation for the Court to eventually create an expansive “good-faith
exception for routine search-and-seizure cases.”49 A leading scholar on the
subject, Tracey Maclin, asserts that such a move would go “nine-tenths of
the way toward repealing the exclusionary rule.”50 Yet, neither the current
remains of the exclusionary rule nor an even more shriveled “bad faith” form
of it has a plausible constitutional grounding,51 which helps reveal why the
Court may be ready to go farther.52 Given that, of the five Justices in the
47

See, e.g., MACLIN, supra note 13, at 336–47 (discussing the Harris and Davis opinions and
explaining how they can provide the foundation for the Court to substantially but not entirely abolish the
exclusionary rule).
48
In Herring, a sheriff’s investigator in Coffee County, Alabama, relied on a telephone report from
neighboring Dale County’s sheriff’s office that there was an outstanding arrest warrant for Bennie Dean
Herring and arrested him. Herring, 555 U.S. at 137. A search incident to arrest revealed that Herring illegally
possessed methamphetamine and a pistol. Id. Ten to fifteen minutes later, the police discovered that the
listing of the warrant in the Dale County database was erroneous. Id. at 138. Thus, the arrest violated the
Fourth Amendment according to prevailing doctrine, id. at 139, and evidence of the drugs and the gun were
the fruit. Nonetheless, the Supreme Court ruled that suppression was inappropriate because the police error
resulted from isolated, ordinary police negligence that was “attenuated” from the illegal arrest. Id. at 144.
The Court asserted that the exclusionary rule serves only to deter “deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent
conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence.” Id. Herring thereby became the first
Supreme Court decision post-Mapp to hold that police negligence in violating the Fourth Amendment was
not enough to warrant suppression. See MACLIN, supra note 13, at 339.
In Davis, the Court concluded that the “reasonable good-faith belief” exception, applicable where
the police rely on a warrant issued on less than probable cause, see United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897,
909 (1984) (quoting Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 255 (1983) (White, J., concurring in judgment)),
should extend to cover a police search based on judicial precedent that was later overruled. Davis, 564
U.S. at 231–32. Expanding on Herring’s focus on police culpability, the Court asserted that exclusion is
inappropriate when police search or seize “with an objectively ‘reasonable good-faith belief’ that their
conduct is lawful” or when their violation “involves only simple, ‘isolated’ negligence.” Id. at 238.
Unlike in Herring, however, the Court made no mention of attenuation, implying that even unattenuated
police negligence in violating the Fourth Amendment was not enough to justify suppression. See
MACLIN, supra note 13, at 341–42. Although the Court would have to narrow the rule more, Professor
Maclin contends that Davis and Herring together may portend that the Court could eventually hold that
only “purposeful, bad-faith police misconduct” can justify exclusion. Id. at 343.
49
MACLIN, supra note 13, at 342.
50
Id.
51
The current exclusionary rule cannot find a plausible constitutional grounding if only because its
contours are insensible given its supposed explanation in utility. For example, there is no good
explanation for why the rule does not apply in civil cases. See Akhil Reed Amar, Fourth Amendment
First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757, 791 (1994). There is no good explanation for why the rule in
the form of a punitive suppression order does not apply to illegal arrests or cases of illegal searches where
no evidence was recovered. See id. at 796–98; Re, supra note 23, at 1895–96. There is no good
explanation for why the rule does not apply to violations of the Fourth Amendment rights of third parties.
See Re, supra note 23, at 1896. Further, there is no good reason why the rule does apply in cases of
serious crimes where the utility analysis would seem to favor admission. See id. at 1896–97.
52
See Re, supra note 23, at 1888 (noting that the Herring opinion endorsed views critical of Mapp,
a case of bad-faith violation, which suggests that the majority was skeptical about retaining even a badfaith exclusionary rule).
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majority in Hudson, three Justices (Roberts, Thomas, and Alito) remain on
the Court and are now part of a six-Justice majority appointed by
conservative presidents (including Gorsuch, Kavanaugh, and Barrett), the
Court might well be prepared to abolish the exclusionary rule entirely.53
On that view, the methods by which the Court could eliminate the
exclusionary rule become important, as do the central normative questions
that abolition would raise: In a world without court-ordered suppression,
how, if at all, should the Constitution protect criminals against government
searches and seizures? And how should it balance protection for law-abiders
between the dual dangers of crime and police abuse? For the sake of
exploring the implications, this Article assumes that the Court will, indeed,
eviscerate the exclusionary rule as a judicially mandated remedy.
The first three Parts of the Article consider alternative ways in which the
Court, in removing the exclusionary rule, could effectively prevent
law-breakers from using Fourth Amendment protections or Court-imposed
remedies to help them pursue and conceal their crimes. Part I explores the
merits and demerits of using a forfeiture theory to abandon the long-standing
notion that criminals have protected Fourth Amendment interests for
purposes of committing and hiding their crimes,54 an approach that would
eliminate any basis for an exclusionary remedy. Part II discusses whether
the Court should use a similar forfeiture theory to reach the somewhat
different conclusion that criminals have no constitutionally based claim to a
remedy for a violation of their Fourth Amendment interests when they have
used them to commit or hide their crimes. Part III discusses the pros and
cons of doing what Hudson suggested—simply abandoning the exclusionary
remedy as non-utilitarian and, on grounds that the Fourth Amendment says
nothing about remedy, leaving the question to Congress and the states. All
three approaches have serious demerits, but reliance on any of them would
thwart criminals from using the Fourth Amendment to their advantage.
Part IV describes an alternative approach that, although a significant
change of course for the Court, would provide some protection to
law-abiders from police overreach. The Court could substitute for the
exclusionary rule an “inclusionary rule.” Its grounding in the Constitution
could rest on a combination of the Fourth Amendment and the right to jury
trial in the Sixth Amendment. This approach would continue to require trial
judges to resolve Fourth Amendment claims in criminal cases and, upon
finding a violation involving evidentiary fruits, to include an instruction to
the jury describing the violation and advising the jurors to decide whether to
ignore the evidentiary fruits or even acquit the defendant of some or all of the
charges. This approach has problems even beyond its substantial change of
direction for the Court. Yet, it would probably protect criminals only
53

Professor Maclin contends that Roberts, Thomas, and Alito are “ready to do so.” MACLIN, supra
note 13, at 342.
54
See supra notes 7–10 and accompanying text.
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modestly. At the same time, it would preserve the ability of the Supreme Court
to develop and refine Fourth Amendment law through criminal cases and to
at least moderately deter violations against law-abiders, whether or not juries
usually would ignore the evidentiary fruits. Moreover, this approach would
have a constitutional grounding that could largely clarify the contours of its
application, which distinguishes it from the current exclusionary rule and most
other proposals to substitute an alternative remedy.55
I. FORFEITURE OF FOURTH AMENDMENT INTERESTS
One way to eliminate the exclusionary rule would be to reject the
existence of legitimate liberty, privacy, or property interests to pursue or
cover up crime. If law-breakers do not have cognizable Fourth Amendment
interests for purposes of pursuing and hiding their offenses, they do not have
a claim for a remedy on the ground that their legitimate interests have been
infringed. On this view, the Court should now revise the claim in Weeks that
the Fourth Amendment applies to all alike, whether they be law-breakers or
law-abiders.56 The Court could abandon that idea and thereby eliminate the
basis for an exclusionary remedy.
A forfeiture theory could help explain this position. The law-breaker can
be seen as justifiably penalized for his wrongdoing by the police intrusion
on his liberty, privacy, and property to discover and seize the evidence or
his body and by his subsequent prosecution, conviction, and sanction.57
Without malefaction like his, the police would not need to invade anyone’s
Fourth Amendment interests to root out crime. Although an extreme view,
the law-breaker’s criminal behavior and cover-up could perhaps even be
seen as complicity in the causal events leading up to the kind of aggressive
search and seizure tactics about which he would complain in a suppression
motion. From either perspective, his wrongdoing would justify holding that
he forfeits the liberty, privacy, and property interests that would otherwise
support such a motion.
Declining to protect liberty, privacy, and property to the extent that they
55
See supra note 51 and infra note 139 (making the point that the current exclusionary rule and
other proposals do not satisfy these criteria).
56
Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383, 392 (1914).
57
Legal forfeiture has applied in other situations involving wrongdoing by an actor seeking a related
legal benefit. For example, a “forfeiture of the right to appeal” under the “fugitive disentitlement
doctrine” justifies the dismissal of an appeal filed by a criminal defendant who becomes a fugitive during
the pendency of the appeal. See Martha B. Stolley, Sword or Shield: Due Process and the Fugitive
Entitlement Doctrine, 87 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 751, 753 (1997) (discussing how appellate courts
typically treat criminal defendants who become fugitives during the pendency of their appeals); see also
Ortega-Rodriguez v. United States, 507 U.S. 234, 239-42, (1993) (discussing the Court’s fugitive
disentitlement case law); WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 1571–72 (6th ed. 2017)
(discussing this forfeiture doctrine). Likewise, under the Federal Rules of Evidence, a party forfeits the
right to offer hearsay evidence under the exceptions listed in Rule 804(b), which require an unavailable
declarant, if that party procured or wrongfully caused the declarant’s unavailability. FED. R. EVID. 804(a).
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are used for criminal ends would have multiple benefits. It would eliminate
Fourth Amendment issues from criminal cases, saving the resources of the
courts. It would eliminate the purported “windfall”58 that we presently
confer on criminal defendants who win evidentiary suppression, while also
clarifying why they are not entitled. It would stop signaling that the law aims
to protect criminal behavior and any concomitant encouragement to crime.
Further, it would end the confusing message that comes with the
exclusionary rule exceptions that the Court does not care enough about those
supposed constitutional violations to provide their sufferers with an effective
and readily available remedy.
This forfeiture-of-interests approach would also neuter all justifications
for the exclusionary rule that build on the proposition that there has
been a government violation of the Fourth Amendment. The approach
would undermine the notion that a criminal defendant can serve as
a proxy for law-abiding persons, which is part of the prevailing
deterrence-of-police-misconduct theory for the exclusionary rule.59 Such a
criminal defendant has forfeited the interests that would give him the proxy
status to represent the law-abiding. Likewise, this approach would render
moot other theories that the Court has used in the past to justify exclusion,
such as that a Fourth Amendment infringement requires exclusion under the
Fifth Amendment privilege, or that judicial integrity requires that the courts
not acquiesce in unconstitutional conduct, or perhaps that the broader
postulates of the Constitution require exclusion of the evidentiary fruits of a
Fourth Amendment violation.60 It would also sideline similar theories
proposed by commentators to support suppression,61 such as that the Due
Process Clauses require exclusion of the evidentiary fruits of a Fourth
Amendment violation.62 None of those theories apply if the defendant has
forfeited through wrongdoing the underlying liberty, privacy, and property
interests that could give rise to a Fourth Amendment motion to suppress.
This rights-forfeiture approach also has benefits beyond justifying
abandonment of the exclusionary rule. The approach explains why criminal

58

MACLIN, supra note 13, at 2.
See supra notes 23–25 and accompanying text.
60
See supra notes 14–17 and accompanying text.
61
The rights-forfeiture approach would neutralize the argument that the exclusionary rule never
does more than try to place the parties in the status quo ante, so that the Fourth Amendment itself imposes
the costs in terms of lost convictions and impaired law enforcement. See MACLIN, supra note 13. Under
the rights-forfeiture approach, there is no Fourth Amendment violation.
62
See Re, supra note 23, at 1890 (arguing that the exclusionary rule should be viewed as “a product
of the Fourth Amendment and the Due Process Clauses working together”). Cf. Albert W. Alschuler,
Regarding Re’s Revisionism: Notes on The Due Process Exclusionary Rule, 127 HARV. L. REV. F. 302,
303, 307–308, 323–24 (2014) (supporting the proposition that the Due Process Clauses can ground an
exclusionary rule, but disagreeing with aspects of Re’s argument and favoring a more robust exclusionary
rule than the one Re proposes).
59
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actors should not have any remedy under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for their
detention, prosecution, and sentence upon conviction. The federal courts
have been forced to use pretzel logic or no logic at all to address why those
outcomes are not proximately caused by a clearly established64 police
violation of the aggrieved defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights and do not
constitute compensable injuries for purposes of § 1983.65 Clearly established
police violations are sometimes an important factual cause of the detentions,
prosecutions, and sentences and are not so divorced from them by any
intervening party’s actions as to relieve the police from liability under
conventional notions of proximate causation.66 A more straightforward
explanation would focus on the wrongdoing of the criminal actor in the first
63

As currently codified, the statute provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage,
of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought
against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial
capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated
or declaratory relief was unavailable. For the purposes of this section, any Act of
Congress applicable exclusively to the District of Columbia shall be considered to be
a statute of the District of Columbia.

42 U.S.C. § 1983. In Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388 (1971), the Court provided, as a matter of federal common law, an equivalent cause of action for
violations by federal officials. Id. at 397.
64
Unless the violation is of clearly established law, the police officer would enjoy immunity from
personal liability in a § 1983 suit, according to the Supreme Court’s “qualified immunity” doctrine. See
Harlow v. Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982) (“We therefore hold that government officials performing
discretionary functions, generally are shielded from liability for civil damages insofar as their conduct does
not violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would have
known.”); see also Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 557 (1967) (inventing the “qualified immunity” doctrine).
65
See, e.g., Lingo v. City of Salem, 832 F.3d 953, 960 (9th Cir. 2016) (in response to claim that
arrest and subsequent harms resulted from illegal search where criminal charges were ultimately dropped,
asserting, inter alia, that “the government’s use of illegally obtained evidence is [not] itself a
constitutional concern”); Black v. Wigington, 811 F.3d 1259, 1268 (11th Cir. 2016) (in response to claim
that arrest and subsequent detention was based on illegal search where criminal charges were dropped,
asserting, inter alia, that “[e]xclusion of the evidence found by [the officers] on the basis that they had
no legal right to search the [area] would, in effect, be an application of the exclusionary rule to this case.”)
(quoting Wren v. Towe, 130 F.3d 1154, 1158 (5th Cir. 1997)); Townes v. City of New York, 176 F.3d
138, 146 (2d Cir. 1999) (in response to claim that arrest was based on illegal stop where the resulting
evidence was erroneously admitted but the conviction was ultimately reversed, asserting, inter alia, that
“the trial court’s refusal to suppress the evidence” was “an intervening and superseding cause of
Townes’s conviction.”); see also Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477, 487 n.7 (1994) (declaring, without
an explanation, that “the ‘injury’ of being convicted and imprisoned (until [the] conviction has been
overturned)” is not an “actual, compensable injury” as required by § 1983).
66
See, e.g., JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 192 (7th ed. 2016) (noting that a
responsive intervening cause does not relieve the initial wrongdoer (here, the police officer) from liability
where (as here) the subsequent events would not be unforeseeable).
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instance as warranting the denial of § 1983 remedies for such outcomes.67
The rights-forfeiture theory provides that explanation given that § 1983
would not apply if there is no violation of a constitutional right.68
Note that, without concern over expanded remedies for law-breakers as
a cost of enforcement, the Court could also adjust Fourth Amendment law
to better protect the liberty, privacy, and property interests of the
law-abiding. For example, the Court could tighten the current law on police
reliance on exigencies to search, which blinks reality about what is a police
threat to enter premises without authority.69 Further, the Court could
abandon the ruling in Illinois v. Gates,70 a decision on the standard by which
to judge probable cause, when based on an informant’s tip, which was
facially illogical and arguably too prosecution-oriented.71 Likewise, the
Court could modify the qualified immunity doctrines that it constructed, on
dubious technical legal grounds, to avoid over-deterrence of police officers
in § 1983 actions seeking monetary remedies.72
While attractive at first blush, however, this rights-forfeiture theory
raises problems. First, it would require the use of a presumption that would
67

Admittedly, the notion that the police officer’s illegal arrest was not the proximate cause of the
detention, prosecution, conviction, and sentence was a long-standing argument used by courts to deny
relief to the prisoner. See Alschuler, supra note 62, at 308.
68
See supra note 65.
69
See Kentucky v. King, 563 U.S. 452, 455–56 (2011) (holding that warrantless police act of
banging on apartment door “as loud as [they] could” and yelling, “[t]his is the police” or “[p]olice, police,
police,” was not a violation of the Fourth Amendment nor a threat to enter in violation of the Fourth
Amendment and, thus, the police could enter on an exigency theory if they subsequently heard noises
inside that indicated occupants were destroying illicit drugs).
70
462 U.S. 213 (1983).
71
In Gates, the Court abandoned a two-pronged standard for assessing informant tips that it had
previously enforced in Aguilar v. Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964), and Spinelli v. United States, 393 U.S.
410 (1969). See Gates, 462 U.S. at 227–30. Under the Aguilar-Spinelli test, the magistrate was required
to find that the informant had an adequate basis of knowledge and was a credible person. See, e.g.,
Aguilar, 378 U.S. at 114. Under Gates, the basis of knowledge and veracity prongs are not treated as
separate requirements. See Gates, 462 U.S. at 233. The Court called for a “totality-of-the-circumstances”
assessment that allowed the strength of one prong to make up for weakness in the other. See id.
Commentators have generally criticized as illogical the Court’s view that the two prongs are not
independently important. See, e.g., Wayne R. LaFave, The Fourth Amendment Today: A Bicentennial
Appraisal, 32 VILL. L. REV. 1061, 1065–70 (1987) (contending that all of the rationales offered by the
Gates majority for abandoning the two-prong standard were unpersuasive); Alexander P. Woollcott,
Recent Development, Abandonment of the Two-Pronged Aguilar-Spinelli Test: Illinois v. Gates, 70
CORNELL L. REV. 316, 329 (1985) (asserting that Gates’s abandonment of the two-prong test neutralized
the “protection against the issuance of warrants based on purely conclusory information provided by
potentially unreliable informants”). It is doubtful that information that an informant is credible should be
understood to indicate that the informant would not rely on hearsay, and it is even more clearly untenable
to assume that a report of first-hand knowledge by an informant means that the informant is a truthteller.
See DRESSLER, MICHAELS & SIMMONS, supra note 4, at 134–36 (discussing several criticisms of the
Gates majority opinion and concluding that it was “probably wrong” that “strength in the basis-ofknowledge prong can make up for weakness in the informant’s veracity”).
72
See William Baude, Is Qualified Immunity Unlawful? 106 CALIF. L. REV. 45, 51 (2018)
(explaining that there are no technical legal grounds that can sustain the modern doctrine of qualified
immunity constructed by the Court).
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rise and fall in unsettling ways. Imagine, for example, that the police in a
murder investigation claim to have discovered a bloody knife in the
defendant’s home through a search and seizure that would have amounted
to a Fourth Amendment violation if no evidence of crime turned up and he
were innocent. Under the rights-forfeiture approach, the defendant would
have no grounds for a motion to suppress. He would be presumed to have
forfeited the otherwise legitimate interests in liberty, privacy, and property
that could support the motion by virtue of having relied on them to pursue
or hide his crime.
Yet, what if the defendant contended that the police planted the bloody
knife and otherwise framed him for the murder? Although the
rights-forfeiture presumption could perhaps still justify refusing suppression
at the criminal trial, it seems that it should not necessarily deny his litigation
of the Fourth Amendment claim in a § 1983 action. The reason is that his
claim of innocence based on a set-up might be true! If he were acquitted, the
presumption of forfeiture of his Fourth Amendment rights seemingly should
disappear. He would then have grounds to pursue a § 1983 remedy for the
improper police search.
But what if the government simply dropped the murder case and did not
go forward? Could the defendant then pursue a § 1983 action? The answer
probably should be yes, although it is not clear how the answer should play
out in the pre-trial civil process on a defense motion for summary judgment
based on forfeiture. How much proof of the plaintiff’s criminal guilt or
innocence should one or the other of the parties have to offer to support or
overcome the motion?
Moreover, what if the police had searched his house and found nothing
relevant but defendant were ultimately found guilty of the murder? Could
defendant pursue the § 1983 action for the search? It seems that he should
be able to do so, at least in theory. But, to play devil’s advocate, why did the
forfeiture of his privacy and property interests not arise and survive, given
that he was, in some sense, always hiding the murder by not coming forward
and confessing it?
Further, what if the defendant were found guilty but still claimed that the
police planted the bloody knife in his home? If we say in the prior scenario
that the failure of the police to find anything during the search would, in
theory, give rise to a non-exclusionary remedy for the improper search, that
bears on our answer to this new scenario. Would not our defendant in this new
scenario also have, at least in theory, a § 1983 remedy? These hypotheticals
reveal that the explanations as to when and why the presumption of forfeiture
arises and disappears is more complicated than we might initially imagine.73
73

Consider what should be the outcome if the police conduct a search that turns up evidence of
crime by a guilty party in the residence or business premises of an innocent party to which the guilty
party has no connection. Should the innocent party have a § 1983 action for money damages if the search
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There are other conundrums associated with this rights-forfeiture
approach. One of them would arise from acknowledging that even
lawbreakers should retain some Fourth Amendment interests. Consider
arrests involving excessive force, such as police shootings of non-dangerous,
but clearly guilty, fleeing suspects.74 Despite the implementation of a
rights-forfeiture approach, it seems that those aggrieved criminal actors
should still have a protected Fourth Amendment interest in their bodily
integrity and recourse of some sort, even if not through an exclusionary
rule.75 However, to make this concession is to begin to acknowledge that it
goes too far to say that criminal actors forfeit all of their Fourth Amendment
interests in the process of committing and covering up their crimes. Indeed,
should we not also protect against the unreasonable destruction of the
criminal actor’s property76 or unnecessary intrusion into his privacy caused,
for example, by a police invitation to the press to accompany them during
the search of defendant’s residence?77 Also, what about a public strip and
cavity search of a person caught with a small amount of marijuana?78 But,
then, precisely how do we define what interests remain nonforfeited, and
how do we justify the distinctions drawn?
How many people, moreover, have occasionally relied on their Fourth
Amendment interests for mostly acceptable purposes, while simultaneously
relying on them secondarily for minor, criminal ones? Imagine a great
performance artist who only commits a crime by concealing a small amount
of marijuana along with several blues harmonicas in his trousers on his way
to a musical extravaganza involving the harps (and enhanced by his marijuana
usage) at which he stands to make several thousand dollars. Suppose he would
also probably bring pleasure to a large gathering of fans who often give him a
series of rousing ovations. Should the police and local government be free
from any requirement of compensation for stopping and searching him at a

would clearly have violated the Fourth Amendment had no evidence of crime turned up? The answer
probably should be yes, but it is not clear.
74
See Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 11 (1985) (prohibiting under the Fourth Amendment the
use of deadly force to prevent the escape of a felony suspect unless the officer has “probable cause to
believe that the suspect poses a threat of serious physical harm, either to the officer or to others”).
75
See id. at 22 (affirming the possible liability of defendants in a § 1983 suit for a police killing by
excessive force of a fleeing felon).
76
See United States v. Ramirez, 523 U.S. 65, 71 (1998) (“Excessive or unnecessary destruction of
property in the course of a search may violate the Fourth Amendment, even though the entry itself is
lawful . . . .”).
77
See Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999) (“[I]t is a violation of the Fourth Amendment for
police to bring members of the media or other third parties into a home during the execution of a warrant
when the presence of the third parties in the home was not in aid of the execution of the warrant.”).
78
Such a strip search could be impermissible although it would be permissible in the station house
or jail setting. See Florence v. Bd. of Chosen Freeholders, 566 U.S. 318, 322–23 (2012) (upholding
embarrassing strip searches, including of body cavities, of petty noncontraband offenders in jail settings).
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drug “checkpoint” without reasonable suspicion, seizing his effects,
arresting him, and thereby preventing his performance, only because he
possessed a small amount of illegal cannabis? If not, the challenge is to explain
how doctrine could reject his reliance on liberty, privacy, and property for
criminal ends, but honor his reliance for other purposes.
The rights-forfeiture approach is also vulnerable to the claim that it is
revisionist in the extreme. The textual objection is not compelling. As noted,
the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly exclude criminal actors from its
protections.80 However, critics favoring rights forfeiture could counter that
unauthorized invasions of the liberty, privacy, and property interests of
persons using them for criminal ends are generally not “unreasonable” in the
language of the amendment.81 To the extent that history matters, this
argument coincides with the common-law “ex post success rule,”82 which
held that if the constable, even without authority, seized a suspect who was
a felon or items that were stolen or contraband, he was not liable.83
Nonetheless, the Court has long followed a contrary view regarding criminal
actors84 and explicitly so more than a century ago in Weeks,85 which also
underscores that rights forfeiture arguably would be the most historically
jarring of the alternatives proposed by which the Court could eradicate the
exclusionary rule.
II. FORFEITURE OF A CONSTITUTIONALLY-GROUNDED REMEDY
As a second option to eliminate the exclusionary rule, the Court could
declare that lawbreakers forfeit their constitutionally-based claim to a
remedy when they rely on their Fourth Amendment interests to commit or
hide their crimes. This approach, unlike the rights-forfeiture approach,
avoids the contention that the Fourth Amendment does not explicitly
79

In City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 47–48 (2000), the Supreme Court rejected under
the Fourth Amendment a drug interdiction checkpoint program that involved suspicionless vehicle stops
that was aimed primarily at enforcement of criminal drug laws.
80
See supra text accompanying note 13; U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
81
There is a plausible rejoinder to this counterargument building on the second clause in the
amendment: The demand that police officers sometimes seek a warrant based on “probable cause”
suggests, given that “probable cause” includes evidence of criminal behavior, that the amendment gives
criminals some protection. Nonetheless, that constitutes an ethereal protection for criminals if the first
clause trumps the second. The criminal would forfeit his Fourth Amendment liberty, privacy, and
property rights by virtue of the government’s discovery of evidence of his criminal behavior (rendering
the invasion “[]reasonable”) where a warrant was not secured. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
82
Steiker, supra note 27, at 829; see also Laura K. Donohue, The Original Fourth Amendment, 83
U. CHI. L. REV. 1181, 1192 (2016) (“What ‘unreasonable’ meant in the seventeenth century was ‘against
reason,’ which translated into ‘against the reason of the common law.’”).
83
See Amar, supra note 51, at 767 (noting that, at common law, “ex post success was a complete
defense”).
84
See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 27, at 528 (“It is [well-settled] that an unreasonable search cannot
be justified by what is found.”) (citations omitted).
85
See supra notes 8–9 and accompanying text.
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exclude lawbreakers from its protections. Under this approach, delinquents
have Fourth Amendment interests by virtue of the text, but have lost any
constitutionally-grounded claim to a remedy due to their wrongdoing.
A “constitutionally-grounded” remedy for present purposes is one that
the Court has concluded the Constitution gives it the authority—but not the
obligation—to impose.86 The prevailing view today is that the exclusionary
rule to enforce the Fourth Amendment is of that kind,87 even if such a
grounding seems implausible in light of the diminished and contorted
contours of the current rule.88 The explanation may come down to the notion
advocated at times by scholars, but not endorsed by the Court, that there
exists something akin to “constitutional common law.”89
The view that a lawbreaker forfeits the constitutionally-grounded
remedy for the violation of his Fourth Amendment rights would operate
similarly in several important respects to the rights-forfeiture approach.
First, like the rights-forfeiture approach, the remedy-forfeiture approach
makes the criminal actor’s wrongdoing the focus of attention. His
dereliction is the reason he is not entitled to what would otherwise
be a constitutionally-justified remedy—evidentiary suppression—for the
violation of his Fourth Amendment interests.
This remedy-forfeiture approach also has several of the same practical
benefits as the rights-forfeiture approach. It would eliminate Fourth
Amendment suppression motions from criminal cases, saving substantial
judicial and prosecutorial resources. It would end the practice of granting
evidentiary suppression in favor of some criminal defendants and stop any
concomitant encouragement to crime. It would also provide a rationale about
why such defendants are not entitled to the benefit that the exclusionary rule
provides. Further, it would end the rather arbitrary disparities that the
exceptions to the exclusionary rule currently cause in the way we treat
criminal defendants who are aggrieved by Fourth Amendment violations.90
86

Davis v. United States, 564 U.S. 229, 243–44 (2011). In Davis, the Court described the
suppression remedy as “a ‘prudential’ doctrine, created by this Court to ‘compel respect for the
constitutional guaranty.’” Id. at 236 (citations omitted).
87
See, e.g., Rosenthal, supra note 27, at 530, 545 (explaining that “contemporary doctrine” rejects
any claim that the Fourth Amendment generally “requires the use of the exclusionary rule,” but that
exclusion is sometimes necessary to achieve constitutionally adequate deterrence).
88
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
89
For the foundational article, see Henry P. Monaghan, The Supreme Court, 1974 Term—Foreword:
Constitutional Common Law, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1 (1975). For arguments against constitutional common law
as a normative theory, see Thomas S. Schrock & Robert C. Welsh, Reconsidering the Constitutional
Common Law, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1117 (1978). For a short rebuttal to Schrock & Welsh, see Daniel J.
Meltzer, State Court Forfeitures of Federal Rights, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1128, 1172–76 (1986).
90
For example, it is not compelling that there is a lesser deterrent effect if a Fourth Amendment
right is enforced in federal habeas rather than on direct appeal in a criminal case. However, in Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 481–82 (1976), the Court held that Fourth Amendment rights cannot be enforced
in federal habeas proceedings where the prisoner received a full and fair hearing on the issue in state
court. That holding appears especially dubious given its exemption for those who did not receive an
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Like the rights-forfeiture approach, this remedy-forfeiture approach also
could respond to any theory that the Court has offered (and some others, as
well) to support the exclusionary rule. It would counter the prevailing
justification that law-breakers effectively represent law-abiders in the
judicial effort to deter police violations of the Fourth Amendment because,
under this approach, the law-breaker has forfeited the remedial right that
would otherwise make him an appropriate proxy. At the same time, this
approach could deflect claims that suppression is the product of the implicit
demands of the Fourth Amendment, the operation of the Fifth Amendment
privilege, the mandates of judicial integrity, the mandates of the Due Process
Clauses, or the force of aggregated provisions of the Constitution.91 Those
theories do not work if the offender’s abuse of his Fourth Amendment rights
bars his reliance on those rights to appeal for a remedy.
However, this remedy-forfeiture approach also poses what some may
see as problems. Unlike the rights-forfeiture approach, this approach cannot
justify the denial of claims by law-breakers under § 1983 for damages
associated with their detentions, prosecutions, and sentences upon
conviction.92 Those are statutory remedies, unlike the exclusionary rule,
which has been constitutionally-grounded (unconvincingly)93 even if not
constitutionally required. And, as we have seen, where a clearly established
Fourth Amendment violation by the police has contributed to a
law-breaker’s detention, prosecution, and conviction, the courts often have
not offered the most satisfying explanations as to why the offending
police officer should be relieved from liability under § 1983 for the full harm
that ensues for the law-breaker, including imprisonment.94 Under the
remedy-forfeiture approach, the lower courts would have to continue to offer
unimpressive rationales for why all the damaging consequences are not
remediable under the statute.95 On this score, then, the rights-forfeiture
approach is superior.96
Another problem focuses on history. The Court has, for many decades,
rejected the notion that an aggrieved criminal defendant has a personal claim
to a constitutionally-grounded remedy for improper police searches and
seizures.97 The Court also has chipped away under a utilitarian analysis at
the only constitutionally-grounded remedy in play—the exclusionary rule.98
adequate hearing in state court. That factor would not bear significantly on whether enforcing the Fourth
Amendment in federal habeas would help deter improper police behavior.
91
See supra notes 14–17, 62–63 and accompanying text.
92
For the text of § 1983, see supra note 63.
93
See supra note 51 and accompanying text.
94
See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text.
95
See supra note 65.
96
See supra notes 67–68.
97
See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.
98
See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.
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To now declare that the criminal defendant forfeits a claim to such a remedy
would depart from the foundation and trajectory of the Court’s last
half-century of opinions on the exclusionary rule.99 It might be slightly less
discordantly revisionist than the rights-forfeiture strategy. However, the
sharp incongruity with past decisions can still be seen as a mark against it.
A final demerit for this remedy-forfeiture approach is its lack of
explanatory transparency. If the exclusionary rule is something
constitutionally inspired but not constitutionally required, eviscerating it on
a “forfeiture” theory seems like an evasion of some more truthful
explanation. The forfeiture notion does not seem quite so disingenuous when
used to void certain liberty, privacy, and property rights of the law-breaker
that survive for the law-abider. But, even in that context, there is deception,
which means that this demerit could also have been listed for the first
approach. The exclusionary rule has been maintained in the modern era not
as a constitutional requirement but as a constitutionally authorized remedy
based on non-textual policy considerations.100 In that light, the more
transpicuous explanation for eviscerating it is that whatever prudential
arguments were thought to justify it in the past are now considered
inefficacious. A forfeiture contention (either of rights or remedies), unless
combined with that more transpicuous explanation, obscures more than
reveals why those policy considerations are no longer valid.
III. ABANDONMENT OF THE UTILITARIAN JUSTIFICATION FOR
THE REMEDY
Instead of relying on forfeiture notions to eliminate the exclusionary rule
and effectively hiding the true explanation, the Court could follow the
implications of its opinion in Hudson v. Michigan101 and merely declare that
the only modern rationale that it has cited to maintain that remedy has
become outdated. The only modern rationale for exclusion, of course, is
deterrence of police misconduct.102 In Hudson, Justice Scalia, for the
majority, suggested that federal civil-rights lawsuits, encouraged by
post-Mapp legislative changes—including, for example, the extension of the
remedy to reach the deep pockets of municipalities and the provision of
statutory fees for plaintiff lawyers—can now adequately remedy Fourth
Amendment violations.103 He also suggested that police officers are less likely
than during the pre-Mapp era to violate the Fourth Amendment because they
99

See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.
101
547 U.S. 586, 588–602 (2006).
102
See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.
103
See 547 U.S. at 597–98 (explaining why the Court should not assume that exclusion in the
modern era is essential simply because the Court found that it was necessary deterrence nearly half a
century earlier).
100
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are generally better trained and more professional. In an appropriate case,
the Court could assert that those changes have made deterrence through
suppression less important across the board such that a cost-benefit assessment
now favors abandoning the exclusionary remedy entirely.
This non-utility approach brings some of the benefits of the second
option—the forfeiture-of-remedies strategy. This non-utility approach
would foreclose all Fourth Amendment suppression motions from criminal
cases, saving public resources. It would eliminate the windfall in the form
of suppression that we currently give to some criminal defendants and
provide a rationale for taking that benefit away. It would also eliminate the
rather arbitrary disparities, resulting from exceptions to the exclusionary
rule, that currently arise in how we treat criminal defendants whose Fourth
Amendment rights have been infringed.105
The principal benefit of this non-utility approach, compared to the first
two, is that it would not cast the Court as so much of a change agent. This
approach would build on the gradual flow of precedent over the last
half-century, during which the Court recast the justification for exclusion as
resting on purely consequentialist considerations and then gradually
restricted it by declaring it non-utilitarian on the margins over and over
again.106 The assertion of changed circumstances regarding the availability
of federal civil-rights remedies and the professionalization of the police as
the justification for the final blow would also help inoculate the Court
against claims of judicial activism. Citing those changed circumstances
would give the appearance that the Court has not become, by dint of its
changed composition, an opponent of the exclusionary remedy, but rather
that the remedy has merely outlived its usefulness.
This non-utility approach, however, has imperfections. The first one also
applied to the remedy-forfeiture approach. Like that second option, this
non-utility approach cannot explain the rejection of suits by law-breakers
alleging clearly established Fourth Amendment violations under § 1983
and seeking police liability for damages associated with their resulting
detentions, prosecutions, and sentences upon conviction. The courts would
have to continue to offer questionable reasoning for why all the damaging
consequences for the aggrieved law-breaker are not remediable under that
provision.107 On this point, then, the first option—the rights-forfeiture
approach—remains superior.108

104
See id. at 598–99 (asserting the “increasing professionalism of police forces” and “the increasing
evidence” that they “take the constitutional rights of citizens seriously”).
105
See supra note 90 and accompanying text.
106
See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.
107
See supra note 65.
108
See supra notes 66–67 and accompanying text.
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An additional demerit arises from the inability of this non-utility approach
to overcome claims that the exclusionary rule is not fully explained as a
prudential doctrine. Despite the Court’s efforts in the modern era to cast the
remedy as only about deterrence of police misconduct and, thus, utility, that
is not the whole truth about its history.109 As Richard Re has noted, the modern
iteration of the rule is not fully consistent with the view that the goal is
deterrence of police violations.110 If that were true, the Court would not, for
example, continue to impose stringent standing requirements on criminal
defendants as a prerequisite to their success on motions to suppress.111
Whether a violation is of the aggrieved defendant’s Fourth Amendment
interests, or those of another person, has little, if anything, to do with the
deterrent effect of suppression.112 Such a requirement is, instead, consistent
with the notion that exclusion is a personal right of the aggrieved party alone.
The current doctrine reflects that the rule was originally thought to be required
for reasons other than police deterrence.113 The non-utility explanation for
abolition does not adequately confront that reality. On this score, therefore, it
is inferior to the first two options—the forfeiture approaches.114
Another demerit of this non-utility approach is that it does not explain
why we should ignore a constitutional right because it is inconvenient to
honor it. If lawbreakers have Fourth Amendment rights, then lawbreakers
should have a meaningful remedy for violations committed against them, at
least when there is one readily available. Otherwise, as Chief Justice
Marshall asserted, the Court is effectively dissembling when it asserts that
lawbreakers have those rights in the first instance.115 On this score, then, a
forfeiture theory is decidedly superior.
Probably the most serious problem with the non-utility approach,
however, is that its basic premise may be false. The Court would be ceding
control over the protection of law-abiders against police overreach to a
potential tyranny of the majority (in legislatures or on civil juries) based on
a wildly unsubstantiated proposition—that suppression is non-utilitarian for
law-abiders. The Court has no good information to conclude that the
exclusionary rule is ineffective and no good basis to decide that if it is
effective the consequences are non-utilitarian.116
109

See supra notes 20–25 and accompanying text.
See Re, supra note 23, at 1894–1902 (asserting that “deterrence arguments cannot justify central
features of current exclusionary doctrine”).
111
See id. at 1896 (contending that this requirement is “nonsensical from a deterrence standpoint”).
112
See id. (noting that “the threat of springing Person A from prison could very well deter police
from violating Person B’s constitutional rights”).
113
Id. at 1899.
114
See supra Parts I–II.
115
See supra notes 40–41 and accompanying text.
116
See generally Danielle Hayes, Note, He Say, She Say: Utah v. Strieff and the Role of Narrative
in Judicial Decisions, 61 HOW. L.J. 611, 624–28, 631–32 (2018) (describing that studies of police activity
110
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The exclusionary remedy may well significantly deter police violations
of the Fourth Amendment against law-abiders in many circumstances, over
and above any deterrent influence of § 1983 remedies. There is anecdotal
evidence to that effect.117 There is also little doubt among the scholarly
community or police, lawyers, and judges participating in the criminal
justice system that exclusion has had some deterrent effect, despite the
debate about the magnitude of its influence in differing circumstances.118 For
example, after the implementation of the exclusionary rule in various
jurisdictions, affected police departments quickly began emphasizing
training of officers so as to avoid the political fallout that would occur if
evidentiary exclusion for violations became common.119 It is reasonable to
think that this newfound concern with following Fourth Amendment law
would have deterred Fourth Amendment violations against law-abiders.
As Carol Steiker has explained, the exclusionary rule also has ensured
“that the courts will develop a fairly comprehensive set of constitutional
guidelines for law enforcement—guidelines that the political branches of
government would otherwise [have] neglect[ed].”120 The judiciary almost
surely would not have developed this Fourth Amendment doctrine without
an exclusionary rule giving defendants an incentive to challenge search and
seizure practices in criminal cases.121 Accordingly, she notes that if the Court
now completely abandons the exclusionary rule, we would plausibly expect
to see not only little action to fill the gap from the political branches but a
“resounding silence” from the judiciary in further developing important
aspects of Fourth Amendment law through § 1983 suits.122

after Mapp initially “suggest[ed] the rule was an effective deterrent,” but has produced “a mix bag of
results” since the advent of exceptions to the exclusionary rule in 1974).
117
See, e.g., Albert W. Alschuler, Studying the Exclusionary Rule: An Empirical Classic, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1365, 1372–73 (2008) (noting that police respond to Supreme Court Fourth Amendment
rulings and that those rulings would not have come about were there no exclusionary rule).
118
See, e.g., id. at 1373 (“Judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, and police officers agree that the
exclusionary rule has influenced police conduct for the better.”); see also Rosenthal, supra note 27, at
540–43 (“[T]he empirical debate centers on the magnitude of the exclusion’s deterrent effects; there is
little debate about whether exclusion has some deterrent effects.”).
119
See, e.g., Alschuler, supra note 117, at 1372 (noting anecdotal evidence that the exclusionary
rule achieves its deterrence effects largely through “long-term guidance and habit formation” occurring
within police departments).
120
Steiker, supra note 27, at 851.
121
Alschuler, supra note 117, at 1372–73; see also Steiker, supra note 27, at 851 (“By creating
litigation incentives in a wide body of cases in which defendants will, of necessity, be provided with
court-appointed counsel, the exclusionary rule ensures that the courts will develop a fairly comprehensive
set of constitutional guidelines for law enforcement – guidelines that the political branches of government
would otherwise neglect.”).
122
Steiker, supra note 27, at 851; see also Rosenthal, supra note 27, at 552 (noting that numerous
“scholars have expressed concern that absent a vigorous exclusionary remedy, the development of Fourth
Amendment law is likely to be stunted”); Nancy Leong, Making Rights, 92 B.U. L. REV. 405, 421–22,
428 (2012) (including a study of federal appellate cases from 2005 to 2009 and revealing that virtually
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There is also little reason to believe that § 1983 suits otherwise would
have much deterrent effect on most police violations.123 There is a high bar
to injunctive relief.124 And, in the relatively few cases when plaintiffs can
get past immunity doctrines and other obstacles to damage relief,125 civil
juries generally remain unreceptive to claims alleging police misconduct.126
The force of the exclusionary rule, moreover, is not, as the Court has often
suggested, simply about the penalizing or disincentivizing effect operating
directly on individual police officers.127 Its influence may come mostly
through its effect on police agencies more generally.128 We can sensibly
believe that police agencies will strive to avoid—through, for example, better
training—the political problems that arise for them if criminals are set free
based on police violations of the Fourth Amendment.129 Moreover, as regards
individual police officers, the influence is likely more complex than its direct
effect on the thinking of those otherwise ready to violate.130 As Professor
Steiker has explained, the exclusionary rule may be effective “not so much
for the fear that it inspires in the ‘bad cop,’ but rather in the way that it creates
an alternative vision of the ‘good cop.’”131 By spurring the development of
rules about what the Fourth Amendment demands, the exclusionary rule has
helped give “good cops” an “aspirational counterpart” to the “highly
all those involving consent, Terry issues, and the vehicle exception were raised in criminal prosecutions
rather than in § 1983 actions).
123
Excessive force claims may produce more jury verdicts for plaintiffs than other claims, but even
those will generally be small. See Leong, supra note 122, at 423 (noting that excessive force claims tend
to be litigated in § 1983 actions); Calabresi, supra note 39, at 115 (noting “jury disinclination to give
significant awards”).
124
See Rosenthal, supra note 27, at 549–50 (noting that “plaintiff must establish a credible and
nonspeculative threat that he will be subjected in the future to an allegedly unreasonable search and
seizure” and, when brought against a municipality, plaintiff must prove an “actionable municipal custom,
policy, or practice”).
125
See id. at 548–50 (discussing various obstacles facing a typical § 1983 plaintiff alleging a Fourth
Amendment violation by police).
126
See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note 39, at 114–15 (explaining that jurors are reluctant to identify
with a criminal defendant or even with an innocent person illegally searched or seized by the police and,
thus, are reluctant in a tort action against the police to render a verdict in the plaintiff’s favor).
127
See Rosenthal, supra note 27, at 541 (contending that exclusion encourages police policy and
training changes that promote compliance with Fourth Amendment doctrine).
128
See, e.g., William J. Mertens & Silas Wasserstrom, The Good Faith Exception to the
Exclusionary Rule: Deregulating the Police and Derailing the Law, 70 GEO. L.J. 365, 399 (1981)
(“[E]ven if a particular constable is indifferent to whether his arrests and seizures result in convictions,
those who run the police department are concerned with successful prosecutions.”).
129
See Daryl J. Levinson, Making Government Pay: Markets, Politics, and the Allocation of
Constitutional Costs, 67 U. CHI. L. REV. 345, 417 (2000) (asserting that the exclusionary rule operates
on the political incentives of the police); Mertens & Wasserstrom, supra note 128, at 399 (“[A]t least the
more professional police forces can be expected to encourage fourth amendment compliance through
training and such guidelines as the department provides for conducting searches, seizures, and arrests.”).
130
See Alschuler, supra note 117, at 1374 (contending that the exclusionary rule “works over the longterm by allowing judges to give guidance to police officers who ultimately prove willing to receive it”).
131
Steiker, supra note 27, at 852.
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aggressive attitudes and behavioral patterns” that tend to develop within
modern police forces.132
For present purposes, however, the important point is that there is often
a lack of clarity about the degree of deterrent influence of the suppression
remedy. While the Court has little good empirical data to decide in what
contexts it is effective, some of the Court’s unsupported contentions about
its ineffectiveness should seem dubious even to critics of the exclusionary
rule. For example, the Court’s unsupported assertion in Herring that
suppression would only marginally deter negligent police violations is
counter-intuitive.133 As the dissenters noted, that position contradicts tort
law’s response to negligent conduct by private actors.134 Yet, the better
criticism is not that the Court is demonstrably wrong about deterrence effects
in one setting or another but that it has generally made assertions as if it had
corroborating information when it is actually shooting in the dark.
When the exclusionary rule deters police violations, moreover, the Court
has no special capacity to make or implement nuanced value judgments
about whether the costs in crime outweigh the benefits in reduced police
abuse for law-abiders. Critics could again justifiably contend that the Court
has done a poor job on this score. For example, an intentional but relatively
unobtrusive police violation, such as the opening of luggage without a search
warrant when the owner is not present, might produce crucial evidence in a
homicide case, and many of us might oppose suppression. Yet, the same
kind of violation might produce crucial evidence in a marijuana possession
case, but most of us might think the police violation to be the greater
problem. Murder is not the same as marijuana possession in most contexts,
including if the question is how to use suppression to maximize law-abiders’
utility. Nonetheless, the Court has not been able to accommodate crime-type
distinctions in its suppression doctrine.135 “The seriousness of the crime and
the future threat posed by the criminal are irrelevant” under the doctrine.136
The non-utility approach would not solve this lack of nuance connected
to the seriousness of the crime. Even if the police were to commit a flagrantly
obtrusive invasion of liberty and privacy in a minor cocaine possession case,
evidentiary suppression would not ensue. Most of us might think that result
is also suboptimal because of the need to restrain police aggression, if not
for the protection of the cocaine possessor, then for the benefit of the
132

Id.
See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 147–48 (2009) (asserting that exclusion would
produce only “marginal deterrence”).
134
See id. at 153 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (arguing that the majority’s position “runs counter to a
foundational premise of tort law—that liability for negligence, i.e., lack of due care, creates an
incentive to act with greater care”).
135
See Rychlak, supra note 23, at 242 (noting that the exclusionary rule requires suppression even
if “the crime involved is serious and the criminal is dangerous”).
136
Id. at 243.
133
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law-abiding. Yet, the larger point is not that the Court is demonstrably wrong
about the value judgment in one particular context or another but that it lacks
any special ability to decide those value questions for us or the capacity to
implement them in a refined way.137
The non-utility theory would also ignore that differing circumstances
exist in different communities. On the dual problems of crime and police
abuse, St. Louis may differ from Ann Arbor, and both may differ from
Washington, Austin, Springfield, and Irvine, not to mention the smaller
places in the great rural expanse. One community may be besieged by crime
but not police abuse or vice versa, while another may have both problems,
and another may have neither. Those differences could substantially
influence value judgments about the propriety of an exclusionary remedy in
criminal cases in those communities. Moreover, those circumstances could
change over time in one community but not another. Yet, the Court’s
doctrine on suppression has treated the country as a static monolith,138 and
the non-utility theory for abandoning the rule would also follow that pattern.
In the end, if the utility of law-abiders is the focus, then a central
contention about why the Court should eliminate the exclusionary rule is also
a central contention about why the Court should not eliminate it without a
constitutionally-grounded substitute. The argument, again, is that the Court is
not a very good decision-maker. That does not mean the Court should rely on
legislatures or civil juries in constitutional tort cases to find the right solution,
given that the Fourth Amendment is not about majority rule. Yet, if they are
not the right decision-makers either, what constitutionally-grounded remedy
should the Court implement?139
137
Difficulties would significantly complicate the imposition of a “serious crimes” exception to the
exclusionary rule, which may, in part, explain why the Court has not imposed it. See Yale Kamisar,
“Comparative Reprehensibility” and the Fourth Amendment Exclusionary Rule, 86 MICH. L. REV. 1,
11–29 (1987).
138
The Supreme Court also has sometimes derided the notion that Fourth Amendment protections
could “vary from place to place and from time to time.” Virginia v. Moore, 553 U.S. 164, 176 (2008)
(quoting Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 815 (1996)).
139
Commentators have proposed various substitutes for an exclusionary rule, such as punishing
offending police officers with contempt citations and providing sentencing concessions or other
administratively supervised remedies to aggrieved criminal defendants. See, e.g., Calabresi, supra note
39, at 115–17 (proposing sentencing concessions for aggrieved criminal defendants combined with
punishments for offending police officers); Rychlak, supra note 23, at 249–53 (proposing criminal
contempt and punishment for certain offending police officers while retaining evidentiary suppression in
some cases); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388, 422
(1971) (Burger, C.J., dissenting) (proposing administrative remedies for aggrieved criminal defendants);
see also Donald Dripps, The Case for the Contingent Exclusionary Rule, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 1, 2
(2001) (proposing that courts “experiment with suppression orders that are contingent on the failure of
the police department to pay damages set by the court”). Some of these proposals would require
legislative enactment. For those that would not, it seems that, while their purpose is to achieve a utilitymaximizing equilibrium for law-abiders, the Supreme Court would not have a good constitutional basis
to impose them on the states and would not be in a good position to supervise them to achieve the utilitymaximizing function.
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IV. AN INCLUSIONARY RULE FOR FOURTH AMENDMENT VIOLATIONS
This Part proposes a constitutionally-grounded remedy for Fourth
Amendment violations against criminal defendants that does not claim
utility-maximization for law-abiders as its primary purpose or that the Court
is the right decision-maker. The proposal is that the Court abandon the
exclusionary rule but substitute a new remedy called an “inclusionary rule”
that would find explanation largely in the Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial. After describing the mechanics of the proposal in Subpart A, Subpart
B takes up the explanation for its constitutional grounding, and Subpart C
provides an assessment of its advantages and demerits.
A. The Approach
The proposed inclusionary rule would focus on criminal juries as
arbiters of the remedy in criminal cases for Fourth Amendment violations.
In the modern era, the idea that juries in criminal cases should play a role in
enforcing the Fourth Amendment is not entirely new.140 A few scholars,
beginning with Ronald Bacigal, have proposed that criminal juries decide
whether the police have violated the amendment141 or that separate screening
juries, according to legislative enactment, decide whether to suppress
evidence or fine police officers for violations.142 However, the inclusionary
140

See generally Ronald J. Bacigal, Putting the People Back into the Fourth Amendment, 62 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 359 (1994) (proposing a structure for Fourth Amendment decisionmaking that, as in the
pre-revolutionary period, gives criminal juries a prominent role).
141
See generally Ronald J. Bacigal, A Case for Jury Determination of Search and Seizure Law, 15
U. RICH. L. REV. 791 (1981) (proposing criminal jury determination of search and seizure law if the trial
judge rules against the defendant in a pre-trial hearing); Bacigal, supra note 140 (presenting an expanded
version of the proposal); see also Michael J. Zydney Mannheimer, Decentralizing Fourth Amendment
Search Doctrine, 107 KY. L.J. 169, 215–17 (2018–2019) (advocating involving juries in Fourth
Amendment search inquiries where positive law provides no clear answer); Lauren M. Ouziel, Beyond
Law and Fact: Jury Evaluation of Law Enforcement, 92 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 691, 735 (2016)
(proposing that criminal juries, based on instructions, be allowed openly to evaluate the propriety of law
enforcement action in rendering its verdict, without supplanting the role of the judge in resolving Fourth
Amendment suppression motions); Meghan J. Ryan, Juries and the Criminal Constitution, 65 ALA. L.
REV. 849, 902 (2014) (arguing that criminal juries should decide criminal constitutional moral matters,
including Fourth Amendment reasonableness); Melanie D. Wilson, The Return of Reasonableness:
Saving the Fourth Amendment from the Supreme Court, 59 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 1, 4 (2008) (advocating
that criminal juries resolve those Fourth Amendment issues that are “heavily dependent on the actions,
beliefs, and perspectives of prudent, ordinary citizens”); Erik Luna, The Katz Jury, 41 U.C. DAVIS L.
REV. 839, 851 (2008) (suggesting that juries could determine whether a government intrusion was a
“search” under the Fourth Amendment); George C. Thomas III & Barry S. Pollack, Saving Rights from
a Remedy: A Societal View of the Fourth Amendment, 73 B.U. L. REV. 147, 150 (1993) (proposing that
jury panels dedicated to resolving all the motions set for a day or week decide whether there was a Fourth
Amendment violation and that judges decide on suppression).
142
See George C. Thomas III, Judges are Not Economists and Other Reasons to be Skeptical of
Contingent Suppression Orders: A Response to Professor Dripps, 38 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 47, 48–49
(2001) (proposing a model, to be instituted by legislation, in which “a screening jury would decide
whether to suppress the evidence or fine the officer”).
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rule proposed here would involve juries in a more limited way, and the
explanation for it would rest largely on the Sixth Amendment right to jury
trial. The criminal trial judge would continue to decide whether there was a
violation of the Fourth Amendment. In cases of violations involving
evidentiary fruits, the judge would include an instruction describing the
violation and advising the jury to decide whether to take further action,
which would involve ignoring the evidentiary fruits and possibly acquitting
the defendant of some or all of the charges.143
Because the judge’s instruction would be crucial to this approach, it
would be subject to review on appeal.144 The instruction should emphasize
that the violation was of the United States Constitution, particularly the
Fourth Amendment. The judge should summarize the facts making out the
violation and advise the jury as to the level of culpability of the wrongdoers,
whether it be purposeful, knowing, reckless, or negligent. The judge should
identify the officials who acted wrongfully, if possible. The judge should
also state what evidence was secured as a result of the violation and make
clear that the jury is authorized to ignore that evidence in reaching its verdict
on some or all of the charges.145 Perhaps the judge could also add that the
jury might weigh the nature of the police violation against the seriousness of
the criminal allegations.146 However, the judge should note that the law
leaves the choice to each juror and should emphasize that each one is free to
act according to their own judgment, conscience, and discretion.
While the proposal does not contemplate that evidence be admitted
regarding the value of evidentiary exclusion, lawyers should be able to argue
the question to a limited extent in their summations. Restricting the
evidentiary presentation would help avoid turning the criminal case into a
minitrial on that question. Also, because, as we will see, the inclusionary
143

The proposal is that the inclusionary rule would not apply where there is no but-for connection
between the violation and the evidence discovered.
Should the inclusionary rule apply where there are no evidentiary fruits? For example, what if the
police illegally arrested the defendant but probable cause developed independently of the illegal arrest
by the time of the defendant’s trial? An example of such a scenario arose in United States v. Crews, 445
U.S. 463, 469 (1980). The proposal is that, as where there is no but-for connection between the violation
and the evidence discovered, the inclusionary rule would not apply.
This position is not crucial to the proposal. If the inclusionary rule were held to apply in such cases,
jurors would decide. (Where there were no evidentiary fruits, they would have to be told of their authority
directly to decide for acquittal.) However, if that position were taken, the Court would then need to draw
some line to clarify when a seizure of the defendant or a search that turned up nothing was otherwise too
disconnected from the prosecution to warrant jury consideration.
144
See Hedgpeth v. Pulido, 555 U.S. 57, 60 (2008) (“[V]arious forms of instructional error are not
structural but instead trial errors subject to harmless-error review.”).
145
Should the judge try to state the value of ignoring the evidence? Is the value in honoring the
aggrieved defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights, in promoting compliance by the police with the
Constitution, or both? The proposal is that the judge would allow jurors to decide.
146
The judge need not try to characterize the seriousness of the charges, because jurors could make
that assessment.
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rule would rest on the Fourth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment right
to jury trial, it would not concern merely utility for law-abiders but also the
jury’s sense of whether to take further action to honor the defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights.147 In any event, as we have seen, there is not good
empirical evidence on the effects of exclusion, and the ultimate utility
question is a value judgment, not an empirical one.148 Nonetheless, the
lawyers could appropriately offer arguments before the jury about the
justifications for ignoring or considering the evidentiary fruits that would
parallel those allowed in death penalty sentencing trials concerning the
utility and justness of a death verdict.149
The proposed inclusionary rule would only apply in limited
circumstances. First, because it would rest heavily on the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial, the rule would only apply in criminal jury trials.150 It would
not apply in civil cases, in probation or parole revocation hearings, or in the
early stages of a criminal case, such as at the preliminary hearing or
the grand jury. Should it apply in criminal bench trials? The proposal is
that it should not, given that the defendant would choose, with the consent
of the prosecutor and judge, whether to waive a jury trial.151 (The parties
could nonetheless agree to have the judge clarify whether she would
suppress in a bench trial.) Yet, in the context of a criminal jury trial, there
would not be many exceptional situations where the evidentiary fruits of a
violation of the defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights would come in
without the violation instruction.
Should the inclusionary rule apply where the police violate the rights of
a third party and thereby secure evidence that incriminates the defendant?
The proposal is that it would not apply in those cases, on grounds that we
need not view the defendant as a proxy for law-abiders where the police have
not infringed his Fourth Amendment rights. This conclusion implies that the
remedy—consideration of his request for evidentiary suppression and
possibly suppression itself—is also personal to the defendant by virtue of its
grounding in his Fourth and Sixth Amendments rights, rather than in
147

See infra text accompanying notes 154–192.
See supra notes 27–32 and accompanying text.
149
In death-penalty cases, trial courts need not allow parties to present all evidence bearing on the
utility or morality of the death sanction. The Supreme Court has held that only evidence bearing on the
offender’s character, record, and crime is required. See Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586, 604 (1978). For a
discussion of evidence that bears on the utility or morality of the death sanction but that does not meet
this test, see Scott W. Howe, Resolving the Conflict in the Capital Sentencing Cases: A Desert-Oriented
Theory of Regulation, 26 GA. L. REV. 323, 324–25 n.11 (1992). Despite the restriction on such evidence,
lawyers are allowed to assert in closing argument, and often do, that the death penalty would or would
not deter similar crimes and that it is or is not justified on moral grounds. See WELSH S. WHITE, THE
DEATH PENALTY IN THE NINETIES: AN EXAMINATION OF THE MODERN SYSTEM OF CAPITAL
PUNISHMENT 112–13 (1991).
150
See infra text accompanying notes 154–192.
151
As regards the rules on waiver of jury trial, see LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 57, at 1287–89.
148
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something with an uncertain constitutional explanation, but purportedly
justified by its utility for law-abiders (the current exclusionary rule).152
Should the inclusionary rule apply to mistakes by non-law-enforcement
government agents, such as magistrates or judges who erroneously issue
warrants? The proposal is that it would apply, unlike the current
exclusionary rule.153 In such cases, the criminal defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights have been violated. There is no persuasive reason to see
those violations differently from police violations for purposes of allowing
the criminal jury to learn of them and their consequences and to decide
whether to take further action.
B. The Constitutional Basis
A combination of the Fourth Amendment and the Sixth Amendment
right to jury trial154 could justify the inclusionary-rule approach. The Fourth
Amendment basis would require that there be a Fourth Amendment violation
and, if so, it would then justify honoring the aggrieved party’s liberty,
privacy, and property rights and protecting those same rights held by others.
The Sixth Amendment grounding would authorize jury action in response
and limit it by requiring that it come in a criminal trial.
The Sixth Amendment protection would operate in its dual role as a
personal safeguard for the charged defendant and as a structural assignment
of decision-making authority.155 According to academic convention, some
constitutional provisions embody individual rights while others embody
allocations of power.156 The Sixth Amendment guarantee of jury trial in
criminal cases is both—“a valued right of persons accused of crime” and “an
allocation of political power to the citizenry.”157
152

United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 906 (1984). This is not crucial to the proposal if we
recognize that constitutional doctrine is often not fully coherent. The inclusionary rule could be held
applicable in such cases on the view that the court should let the jury determine how to balance the dual
dangers of crime and excessive police aggression whether or not the defendant has standing.
153
See id. at 916 (declaring that the exclusionary rule was not designed to punish the errors of
judicial officers).
154
See U.S. CONST. amend. VI (“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a
. . . trial, by an impartial jury . . . .”).
155
See Albert W. Alschuler & Andrew G. Deiss, A Brief History of the Criminal Jury in the United
States, 61 U. CHI. L. REV. 867, 876 (1994) (“Jury trial was a valued right of persons accused of crime,
and it was also an allocation of political power to the citizenry.”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights
as a Constitution, 100 YALE L.J. 1131, 1183-85 (1991) (explaining that the Sixth Amendment right serves
both functions).
156
See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 155, at 876 (asserting that academic convention divides
constitutional provisions into two classes—those that “allocate governmental power” and those that
“guarantee individual rights”).
157
Id. Cf. Laura I Appleman, The Lost Meaning of the Jury Trial Right, 84 IND. L.J. 397, 405 (2009)
(“[T]he right to a jury trial, particularly in the criminal context, was viewed almost exclusively as the
people’s right, not as a right of the accused . . . .”).
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The Sixth Amendment right to jury trial has been understood as more
important than the textually similar dual-role protection—the Seventh
Amendment right to jury trial in certain civil cases.158 First, the right in the
Sixth Amendment, unlike that in the Seventh, has been deemed
“fundamental to the American scheme of justice” and thus has been
incorporated against the states.159 Further, the right in the Sixth, unlike that
in the Seventh, has been understood to give the judiciary less room to intrude
on the authority of the jury to decide matters in favor of protected parties,160
which, in the case of the Sixth Amendment, includes only criminal
defendants, and, in the case of the Seventh Amendment, encompasses civil
litigants more generally.161 Criminal trial courts “may not direct a verdict of
guilty, in whole or in part, no matter how conclusive the evidence might
appear.”162 To do so would impede the jury’s acknowledged power to render
a verdict of not guilty “in the teeth of both law and facts,”163 and would
“invade the defendant’s constitutionally protected right to trial by jury.”164
Criminal trial courts also must use great care in employing special verdict
forms, lest they infringe on the criminal jury’s independence.165 In contrast,
federal trial courts in civil cases, among other actions that lessen the civil
jury’s power, grant motions for summary judgment,166 direct verdicts,167 and

158

See U.S. CONST. amend. VII (“In suits at common law, where the value in controversy shall
exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved . . . .”).
159
Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 149
(1968); see also McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742, 765 n.13 (2010) (listing the Seventh
Amendment as not incorporated).
160
See, e.g., LaFave, supra note 71, at 1397 (noting that use of special verdicts is common in civil
jury trials but not in criminal jury trials).
161
See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
162
LaFave, supra note 71, at 1397.
163
Horning v. District of Columbia, 254 U.S. 135, 138 (1920).
164
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 57, at 1397 (citing United States v. Martin Linen Supply Co., 430
U.S. 564, 572 (1977) (stating that a criminal trial judge may not direct a verdict in favor of the prosecution
or instruct jury to do so); Connecticut v. Johnson, 460 U.S. 73, 84 (1983) (stating the same)); see also
Duncan, 391 U.S. at 156 (asserting the framers’ view that “[i]f the defendant preferred the commonsense judgment of a jury to the more tutored but perhaps less sympathetic reaction of the single judge,
he was to have it”).
165
See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 57, at 429 (noting that “special verdicts and special
interrogatories can limit jury independence”); see also United States v. Spock, 416 F.2d 165, 182–83 (1st
Cir. 1969) (holding that use of special questions to jury in criminal case violated defendants’
constitutional right to jury trial).
166
See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (providing that a civil litigant may move for and a court may grant
summary judgment).
167
See, e.g., Treat Mfg. Co. v. Standard Steel & Iron Co., 157 U.S. 674, 675 (1895) (approving trial
court instruction directing civil jury to return a verdict for defendants); Randall v. Balt. & Ohio R.R. Co.,
109 U.S. 478, 482 (1883) (approving the same).
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employ special verdict forms that lead the jury toward verdicts that accord
with the law and the evidence.168
The long history of judicial acceptance of the limited power169 of the
criminal jury to nullify170—or, in other words, to “acquit against
instructions”171—helps reveal a constitutional basis for the inclusionary-rule
approach.172 That acceptance demonstrates recognition of the criminal jury’s
purpose as more than simply “resolution of factual disputes.”173 The apparent
view that the Sixth Amendment right embraces this broader function174
would allow the Supreme Court to use the provision to constitutionally ground
the inclusionary-rule approach. The proposal contemplates telling jurors of
their authority to decide the suppression question while the nullification power
of criminal juries is not conferred on them through explicit instructions.175 Yet,
implementing the inclusionary-rule approach remains sensible as Sixth
Amendment doctrine. The central reason not to tell jurors of their nullification
power is to try to ensure that they only rarely use it and only in favor of the
criminal defendant.176 When jurors nullify, they ignore or override the law
about which the judge instructs them. To implement the inclusionary-rule
approach and openly instruct jurors on their authority regarding suppression
would encourage them not to ignore or override existing law but to decide
when to take further remedial action on grounds that the Court would

168

See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 57, at 429 (“The use of ‘special verdicts’ or ‘special
interrogatories,’ whereby the jury is required to respond to a series of fact questions in connection with
the return of its verdict, is a common practice in civil cases but not in criminal cases.”).
169
The power is limited in that it appears, for example, that trial courts can excuse for cause
members of a jury venire “who admit that they will not follow the law.” Id.
170
Bacigal, supra note 141, at 817; DENNIS HALE, THE JURY IN AMERICA: TRIUMPH AND DECLINE
19 (2016).
171
See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 155, at 912–14 (discussing the political power of early
American juries to “acquit against instructions”).
172
The widespread view at the time of the founding was that criminal juries had even more power
than that embodied in the notion of nullification. See infra text accompanying note 181.
173
Bacigal, supra note 141, at 818.
174
See infra note 184 and accompanying text; see also Raoul Berger, Justice Samuel Chase v.
Thomas Jefferson: A Response to Stephen Presser, 1990 BYU L. REV. 873, 889–90 (endorsing the view
that the nullification power was “embodied” in the constitutional right to jury trial in criminal cases). For
a view questioning whether it is correct to assert that jury nullification, even in restricted form, is part of
the Sixth Amendment right, see LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 57, at 1285–86.
175
See LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 57, at 186 (“Courts have . . . rejected any constitutional right to an
instruction that informs the jury that it has the power to disregard the law and acquit.”); see also CLAY S.
CONRAD, JURY NULLIFICATION 5 (2014) (“We want jurors to intervene on occasion . . . without us telling
them about their power to do so . . . .”). For the view that jurors should be told of their power to nullify, see
Alan W. Scheflin, Jury Nullification: The Right to Say No, 45 S. CALIF. L. REV. 168, 168 (1972).
176
See, e.g., United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d 1113, 1134–35 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“There is reason
to believe that the simultaneous achievement of modest jury equity and avoidance of intolerable caprice
depends on formal instructions that do not expressly delineate a jury charter to carve out its own rules of
law.”); Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 155, at 914 n.246 (noting that the power to disregard instructions
can “disadvantage defendants rather than aid them”).
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acknowledge are not closely regulated by legal rules or standards. The Sixth
Amendment can support this move.
The Court could ground the inclusionary-rule approach in the Sixth
Amendment right without explicitly endorsing “nullification.” The Court
may be hesitant to use such terminology out of concern that it could suggest
that the accused has a limited right to law-nullifying jurors—an idea that is
hard to qualify properly.178 Instead, the Court could emphasize the
traditional role of the criminal jurors in serving dual functions, and focus on
their role as “political participants,”179 charged with balancing the power of
the judiciary by representing “popular-sentiment.”180
Founding era history supports more than it undermines the
inclusionary-rule approach. The Framers believed strongly in the importance
of criminal juries181 in an era when juries decided cases through their authority
to render general verdicts, typically with little or no binding instructions on
law from the judge.182 Juries in that era were widely viewed as authorized to
serve as judges of both the law and the facts.183 Given those circumstances,
177

For this reason, implementing the inclusionary-rule approach also need not be understood to
contravene the proposition first articulated by the Court in Sparf v. United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895),
over a lengthy dissent, see id. at 163 (Gray, J., dissenting), that juries were no longer to be understood as
judges of the law.
178
United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d at 1133–34; see also Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412,
424 (1985) (holding that prospective jurors in a capital case may be excluded for cause if their views
disfavoring capital punishment would substantially impair their ability to perform their duties as jurors
in accordance with the law).
179
Amar, supra note 155, at 1187.
180
Id. at 1189.
181
See, e.g., Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145, 156 (1968) (noting the Framers’ regard for the
criminal jury as a crucial safeguard against a rogue judiciary); Amar, supra note 155, at 1183 (noting that
the criminal jury was guaranteed in both Article III, Section 2, of the body of the Constitution and in the
Sixth Amendment); see also DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 20 (U.S. 1776) (listing as a
grievance against George III his “depriving us . . . of the benefits of trial by jury”).
182
See, e.g., Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 155, at 903–06 (explaining that “the authority of
American juries to decide questions of law may have arisen from haphazard practice at a time when most
judges lacked legal training” but that this power “became a symbol of trust in the public’s sense of
justice”); see also Robert Ireland, The American Jury: From Judge of the Law to Trier of the Facts, in A
HANDBOOK OF JURY RESEARCH 2-1, 2-2 (Walter F. Abbott & John Batt, eds., 1999) (“Sometimes judges
endeavored to instruct jurors, but seldom in binding fashion.”); John P. McClanahan, The “True” Right
to Trial by Jury: The Founders’ Formulation and Its Demise, 111 W. VA. L. REV. 791, 808 (2009) (“At
the time of the Founding, it was almost universally accepted that juries in criminal cases had the right to
decide issues of law.”).
183
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 155, at 912; Amar, supra note 155, at 1185, 1191–95; Ireland,
supra note 182, at 2-2; Mark DeWolfe Howe, Juries as Judges of Criminal Law, 52 HARV. L. REV. 582,
590–95 (1939); see also HALE, supra note 170, at 27 (“By the late eighteenth century, the right to find a
‘verdict . . . according to conscience’ had achieved the status of conventional wisdom.”). Cf. William E.
Nelson, The Lawfinding Power of Colonial American Jurors, 71 OHIO. ST. L.J. 1003, 1028 (2010)
(concluding that founding era juries in New England and Virginia, although not in Pennsylvania, New
York, and the Carolinas, possessed law-finding authority).
Views on the legitimate authority of the criminal jury were evolving during the nineteenth century.
See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 155, at 906–10; Ireland, supra note 182, at 2-4. However, by mid-
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the criminal juries contemplated by the Sixth Amendment may well have been
thought vested with the authority to acquit not simply through nullification but
lawfully when they thought the prosecution unconstitutional.184 Moreover,
colonial jurors confronting seizures in prosecutions for violations of English
law had frequently acquitted, and it is “a fair inference ” that some of those
acquittals were “based, at least in part, upon their conclusion of law that the
seizures were illegal.”185 In that era, then, the importance of instructions
openly acknowledging jurors’ authority to ignore evidence based on an illegal
search and seizure would not have been apparent. “Most early American
jurors were already aware of their power to judge the law.”186 Hence, the
imposition of an inclusionary-rule approach—with jurors being told of their
authority to judge suppression—would seem essential to conform with the
historical understanding of the Sixth Amendment jury-trial guarantee.187
If criminal juries once passed on the propriety of searches and seizures,
however, why not enlist them to do so again rather than limit them to
deciding whether to suppress the evidentiary fruits of a violation?188 The
reason focuses on the need for guidance of police officers regarding the
meaning of the Fourth Amendment. Changed circumstances that underscore
why originalism allows an inclusionary-rule approach also underscore why
originalism does not demand more. The need for legal guidance to direct the
work of our now extensive law enforcement personnel189 requires that the
judiciary assume the task. We could not expect police officers to know how
they are permitted to investigate crime through the unpredictable and
unexplained general verdicts of juries.190 The inclusionary-rule approach

century, at least fifteen of the thirty states still authorized criminal juries to resolve legal questions. See
Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 155, at 910–11. Moreover, the Supreme Court did not disavow the notion
that juries were legitimate judges of the law in federal court until Sparf, decades after the adoption of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and, even then, only over a long and forceful dissent. See generally, Sparf v.
United States, 156 U.S. 51 (1895) (rejecting the notion that criminal juries may rightfully disregard the
law as provided them by the court and become judges of the law themselves).
184
See Amar, supra note 155, at 1185 (noting that this view was widely endorsed by many
constitutional theorists in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries); see also VALERIE P. HANS
& NEIL VIDMAR, JUDGING THE JURY 37 (1986) (asserting that “the writings of Adams, Jefferson,
Elbridge Gerry, and other framers of the Constitution made it clear that they believed that the jury could,
and should, decide law as well as fact.”).
185
Bacigal, supra note 141, at 800.
186
Conrad, supra note 175, at 65.
187
Juries were not diverse at the time of the founding and typically were not so even by the early
1960s. See Alschuler & Deiss, supra note 155, at 878; see also infra text accompanying notes 199–202.
Although juries are now more diverse, it seems that few, if any, serious critics would claim that an
inclusionary-rule approach involving diverse juries should founder on that basis.
188
See supra note 141 (identifying scholars who have argued for this approach).
189
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 67 (1993) (noting
that there were no full-time police and few full-time criminals); Steiker, supra note 27, at 837.
190
See Bacigal, supra note 140, at 391 (noting that the randomness of juries would present a
problem in settling Fourth Amendment law according to fixed, legal principles).
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constitutes a plausible construction of the Sixth Amendment that aims to
be pragmatic.191
C. An Assessment
The implementation of an inclusionary rule would reflect a genuine
concern not only with honoring the aggrieved defendant’s Fourth
Amendment rights but also with balancing the dangers of police abuse and
crime. Regarding police, the effect intuitively would be to deter some
violations of the Fourth Amendment against law-abiders. The prospect of a
judge’s instruction identifying a violation and the wrongdoers—in essence,
a public reprimand—would often be unpleasant for the officers involved and
their superiors. The prospect that jurors might also disregard any evidentiary
fruits and even acquit the defendant for the violation would compound the
police discomfort and encourage continued training about Fourth
Amendment doctrine to promote compliance. At the same time, the likely
effect on law-breakers, or potential law-breakers, would seem appropriately
limited. Juries might often ignore the violations and convict the guilty
defendant, especially in serious cases, and, if not on the greater offense
charged, on the lesser-included one.192 Also, it appears implausible that
persons who actually contemplate serious crimes or even minor ones would
commonly expect that improper invasions of their liberty, privacy, or
property interests that turn up evidence against them would generate
sympathy from criminal juries. We cannot estimate the outcome of the
approach with much precision, although it seems unlikely to prove as
problematic as the Court’s efforts to impose and then diminish the
exclusionary rule.
A benefit of the inclusionary rule, moreover, is that it does not claim a
correct utility regarding the use of evidentiary suppression. The inclusionary
rule acknowledges that there is value merely in honoring the aggrieved
defendant’s Fourth Amendment rights. Also, being unable to estimate with
great accuracy how it would play out everywhere in terms of its effect on
crime and police abuse can be understood as a positive rather than a negative.
191

Should this construction of the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial apply to some other
violations of constitutional rules governing police practices, such as those regarding suspect statements?
Those questions deserve extensive consideration and are beyond the scope of this Article.
192
There are good reasons to suspect that juries made up of law-abiders would often be indifferent
to violations committed against criminals. Many law-abiders may believe that the police will not
commonly violate law-abiders’ Fourth Amendment rights. See Bacigal, supra note 140, at 417 (asserting
that law-abiding citizens may generally be “confident that the police will not direct unreasonable searches
at them”). Or, if the jurors are white and middle-class, they may “often fear the robbers more than the
cops because the robbers tend to be mostly poor and/or members of minority groups and because cops
tend to focus their attention on just such disfavored groups.” Steiker, supra note 27, at 850. In addition,
many jurors may simply believe that those who are doing nothing wrong have nothing to hide and should
willingly submit to police intrusions. See, e.g., Tom Wicker, Rights vs. Testing, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28,
1989, at A25 (discussing Washington Post/ABC poll revealing that most respondents held such views).
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In this view, the inclusionary-rule approach would produce different results
in different counties depending on the counties’ circumstances related to
existing crime and police abuse rates. Assuming that concerns about crime
and police abuse vary in different counties, it is appropriate that the
responses would differ as well.
The inclusionary-rule approach would also allow for variation based on
the type of crime involved. The same police violation might be treated
differently in a capital murder prosecution than in a minor drug possession
prosecution. Unlike the Supreme Court, juries could consider Fourth
Amendment violations on a case-by-case basis without having to articulate
principles that would apply across the nation.
The inclusionary-rule approach also would not reflect deference to
majority rule. It would accomplish something different than leaving the
question of remedy for violations in criminal cases to Congress and the
states. The inclusionary-rule approach would also differ, more specifically,
from allowing civil juries in constitutional tort cases to decide what to do
regarding aggrieved criminal defendants. The reason is that, unlike in
constitutional tort cases, the government has the burden of proof in criminal
cases, and criminal juries do not operate based on majority rule. Ramos v.
Louisiana recently clarified that criminal jury verdicts favoring conviction
must be unanimous throughout the states.193 The unanimity requirement
means that “[a] jury must reach a unanimous verdict in order to convict.”194
In some cases, a mistrial rather than a conviction would result, and, in a few,
where all of the jurors concurred on the need to ignore the evidentiary fruits,
an acquittal as opposed to a conviction could follow.195
In reducing police abuse against minorities, the inclusionary-rule
approach would also seem substantially more effective as a
constitutionally-grounded remedy rather than simply abandoning the
exclusionary rule, despite the history of racial discrimination in the
composition of American criminal juries.196 The racial bias problem and the
absence of an incorporated mandate of jury unanimity would have
undermined this approach as a protection for minorities if the Court had
implemented it in Mapp in the early 1960s. However, along with unanimity
rules,197 the law of jury composition has changed.198 The modern Court has
193

140 S. Ct. 1390, 1397 (2020).
Id. at 1395.
195
See id. at 1394.
196
See RANDALL KENNEDY, RACE, CRIME, AND THE LAW 172–80 (1997) (discussing the racial
exclusion of Black prospective jurors during the late 1800s through the 1990s); DAVID COLE, NO EQUAL
JUSTICE: RACE AND CLASS IN THE AMERICAN CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM 105–07 (1999) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s toleration of racial exclusions of Black prospective jurors for decades after declaring
race discrimination in jury selection unconstitutional).
197
See supra text accompanying notes 187–188.
198
See supra text accompanying note 186.
194
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required that states take steps to promote representative jury pools. Also,
in the Batson line of cases, the Court has taken modest steps to ensure that
litigants do not use peremptory strikes to eliminate prospective jurors based
on race or gender.200 The Court reiterated this proscription most recently
in Flowers v. Mississippi.201 Those changes, along with changes in racial
attitudes, could help modestly to mitigate racial discrimination in the
operation of the rule.202
This approach would also help the Court avoid claims from both
proponents and opponents of the exclusionary rule that it is acting without
good information and in the face of its own incapacity. As we have seen, a
central objection to the Court’s decisions both maintaining and undermining
the exclusionary rule is that the Court lacks a good basis to make such
decisions or the ability to act in a nuanced fashion.203 By turning decisions
about when to suppress and acquit over to criminal juries, the Court could
avoid those justified criticisms.
Perhaps the most important benefit of the inclusionary rule is that it
would allow the Court to continue to use criminal cases to direct law
enforcement and lower courts on the meaning of the Fourth Amendment.
Given the possibility of jury suppression and acquittal, criminal defendants
would continue to have a strong incentive (in addition to discovering
information about the government’s case through pre-trial hearings on the
claims) to raise Fourth Amendment issues in pre-trial motions seeking an
instruction on any violation. Trial judges would also continue to hold
hearings and render rulings on those motions in much the same way that they
do under current doctrine. On review of those rulings, appellate courts,
including the Supreme Court, would be able to continue to develop Fourth
Amendment law to guide the police. The same would not be true if the Court
pursued any of the options for eliminating the exclusionary remedy that have
been presented in the first three parts of this article.
The inclusionary rule approach, however, could not be expected to
achieve any utility maximizing equilibrium between the dangers of crime
and police abuse facing law-abiders. The inclusionary rule does not purport
to focus juries on the problem of maximizing utility for law-abiders.
199
See, e.g., Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 175 (1986) (noting that the exclusion of Blacks,
women, or Mexican-Americans from jury venires could violate the representativeness requirement);
Peters v. Kiff, 407 U.S. 493, 502–04 (1972) (plurality opinion) (holding that the systematic exclusion of
Blacks from grand and petit juries violated due process).
200
See, e.g., Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 97 (1986) (discussing race); J.E.B. v. Alabama ex
rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 143, 145 (1994) (discussing gender).
201
See 588 U.S. 1, 31 (2019) (holding that trial court committed error in allowing state’s peremptory
strike of Black prospective juror).
202
Despite these changes, Black citizens still tend to be underrepresented on juries for a variety of reasons.
See KENNEDY, supra note 196, at 232–37 (explaining a variety of grounds for their underrepresentation,
including their underrepresentation on voter registration lists).
203
See supra text accompanying note 139.
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Juries also will not know much about how to maximize utility even if they
focus on it. Jurors often will not know the situation regarding crime and
abusive police in a particular neighborhood where the events occurred or
even in the larger county where they are called to serve. Some counties
encompass many different communities, and the proposal does not call for
evidentiary presentations on the general problems of crime and police abuse
in the locality. Jurors could still act on crime-type distinctions and
police-culpability nuances that the Supreme Court has been unable to
implement.204 Some jurors might also appreciate local concerns that are
relevant to the problems. In their summations, lawyers could also allude to
the relevant considerations. Yet, many jurors would likely not know how to
come to a much better resolution of the problems (in a utility-maximizing
sense) than would Supreme Court Justices.
Because “the great majority of criminal cases” result in guilty pleas,205
the inclusionary rule would also only produce an instructional reprimand and
jury consideration of a Fourth Amendment violation in a small proportion
of cases. The rule would probably influence plea negotiations somewhat,
and prosecutors in plea-bargained cases might sometimes communicate to
police officials their displeasure that a police violation of the Fourth
Amendment warranted an extra prosecutorial concession. The same could
be said regarding the current exclusionary rule. However, the influence of
the inclusionary rule on plea bargaining and, thus, in deterring violations of
the Fourth Amendment, might be even murkier given the uncertainty over
how jurors would react to a violation instruction.
This approach would also perpetuate one of the demerits attributed to
the two approaches presented in Parts II and III. It would not eliminate the
need for federal courts to give contorted reasons for denying criminals
damages in § 1983 actions for clearly established Fourth Amendment
violations that helped cause their detentions, prosecutions, convictions, and
sentences.206 Only the first option presented in Part I, involving rights
forfeiture, provides a good explanation for those outcomes.207
This inclusionary rule approach may also give criminals at least some
potential assistance in committing and covering up their crimes. Although
this concern seems inconsistent with concerns that the approach may have
modest deterrent influence, the larger point is that we cannot be sure. To the
extent that the rule results in reprimanding instructions from trial judges and
jury actions favoring accused persons, it would protect criminals and might
also modestly encourage crime.
A final, major concern is that implementing this approach would
constitute a significant change of direction for the Court. After so many
204

See supra notes 131–132 and accompanying text.
LAFAVE ET AL., supra note 57, at 1194.
206
See supra note 65 and accompanying text.
207
See supra notes 67–68 and accompanying text.
205

652

CONNECTICUT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:3

decades with the exclusionary rule, substituting the inclusionary rule might
suggest that constitutional law lacks an enduring meaning. The move might
seem to square more easily with the view that constitutional law is not “an
expression of values written into the Constitution by the framers, but . . . the
product of a continuing process of valuation carried on by those to whom
the task of constitutional interpretation has been entrusted.”208 For some
observers, that perspective would be unsettling. Moreover, the Court might
not be fully able to counter it even by pointing to the historical powers of
the criminal jury or by noting the Court’s lack of previous consideration of
the Sixth Amendment right to jury trial as a basis to address Fourth
Amendment violations.
CONCLUSION
By assuming that the Supreme Court will abolish the exclusionary rule
and by considering potential alternatives, this Article has demonstrated a
conundrum that surrounds the Fourth Amendment. The alternatives are all
problematic. This point may be reason enough for the Court to maintain
an admittedly flawed exclusionary rule. Yet, there remain good grounds to
rank the options. A comparison among them bears, if not on what approach
the Court should have pursued in the past,209 then on what approach it should
follow if, as it has hinted, it might eliminate court-ordered exclusion in
the future.
This Article favors an inclusionary rule as the best alternative to the
exclusionary rule. The approach has flaws, but it would appear to be a
workable method to promote the utility of law-abiders. By allowing the
judiciary to continue to use criminal cases to develop search and seizure
doctrine to guide law enforcement, while also allowing criminal juries, after
an instruction reprimanding violators, to decide the suppression question,
the approach could moderately promote government compliance with the
Fourth Amendment. At the same time, because jurors might frequently not
ignore the evidentiary fruits, particularly in serious criminal cases involving
minor or only negligent violations, the approach would seem to protect and
encourage lawbreakers only modestly in their efforts to commit and cover
up crimes.
The inclusionary-rule approach would also represent an effort to
implement an acceptable balance between crime and police abuse, though
208
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that is not its overriding purpose. The approach does not claim a correct
utility regarding the use of evidentiary suppression. Jurors would not be told
to try to effectuate such an equilibrium. The inclusionary rule acknowledges
that there could be value merely in honoring the aggrieved criminal
defendant’s Fourth Amendment interests. However, jurors would decide on
the value of suppression in the process of deciding whether to suppress.
The inclusionary-rule approach would also rest on a constitutional theory
that would explain the basic contours of its application. Because it would
depend heavily on the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial in criminal cases,
it would not apply in civil cases, in probation or parole revocation hearings,
or in the early stages of a criminal case, such as the preliminary hearing or the
grand jury. On this score, it is superior to the current exclusionary rule, which
has no constitutionally grounded explanation.210
Before presenting the inclusionary-rule approach in Part IV, this
Article proposed three routes that the Court could follow to eviscerate
the exclusionary rule without imposing a constitutionally grounded
substitute: Part I presented a rights-forfeiture theory; Part II presented a
remedy-forfeiture theory; and Part III presented a nonutility theory. Those
approaches would rely primarily on legislatures to protect law-abiders from
Fourth Amendment violations. The principal protection envisioned would
come from legislatively authorized civil rights suits. It is not apparent that
there is a better constitutionally grounded substitute for the exclusionary rule
than the inclusionary rule.211 Thus, if the Court were convinced that
evidentiary suppression in criminal cases is always nonutilitarian for
law-abiders and that the Constitution cannot support an inclusionary rule,
those first three proposals would seem to represent the available options.
In that case, which of those first three routes to evisceration would be
preferable? One might be tempted to pick the approach presented in Part I:
Criminals should, with a few exceptions, forfeit Fourth Amendment
interests that would help them commit and hide their crimes and, thus, also
forfeit the associated remedies by virtue of their wrongdoing. However, it
would seem essential to couple that approach with an explanation from the
Court about why evidentiary suppression is non-utilitarian across the
spectrum of Fourth Amendment violations. For more than fifty years, the
Court has pronounced that the exclusionary rule is all about utility, both
when parts of the rule have been preserved and when other parts of it have
been pared.212 For the Court now to offer forfeiture as the sole reason for
abolition would be disingenuous.
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With that caveat (and a few others), the rights-forfeiture approach
would allow a simple answer to the big question: how can the Fourth
Amendment give criminals protection in their efforts to commit and hide
their crimes? The answer would be that it does not because they would
forfeit those rights through their abuse of them to pursue their criminal ends.
The rights-forfeiture approach would also allow a simple answer to another
big question: how can criminals purportedly have all the Fourth Amendment
rights to liberty, privacy, and property that law-abiders have, and yet we do
not give them a readily available remedy—evidentiary suppression—when
those rights are violated to their great detriment? The answer again would
be that criminals no longer have such rights because they forfeit them
through their wrongdoing.
In the end, however, none of the approaches discussed in this Article
clearly deserves honorable mention as a second choice to the inclusionary-rule
approach. From the perspective of maximizing utility for law-abiders, a
central argument for why the Court should eliminate the exclusionary rule is
also a central argument for why the Court should not eliminate it without
imposing a constitutionally grounded substitute that, to a modest degree,
protects criminals. The Court lacks the information and capacity to
convincingly declare that the exclusionary rule maximizes utility for
law-abiders. Yet, the Court also lacks the information and capacity to
convincingly deny that a suppression remedy, implemented in some form—by
local criminal juries—is utilitarian for law-abiders. The inclusionary-rule
approach is a worthy alternative to turning the enforcement of the Fourth
Amendment over completely to some form of majoritarian rule. And, by good
fortune perhaps, the inclusionary-rule approach finds support in the historical
powers of the criminal jury that are plausibly viewed as embodied in the right
to jury trial in the Sixth Amendment.
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